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| 1 |
ID:
192040
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| Summary/Abstract |
It has been argued that large military spending is often a crucial constraint in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, and high corruption has enabled these countries to keep such large military spending. One possible remedy is to promote information and communication technology (ICT), which may cause the anti-corruption policies to become more effective in increasing transparency for the public and reducing unnecessary and abusive military spending. This study discusses the nexus among corruption, military spending, and ICT with a panel data of 48 SSA countries from 2003 to 2015. Our analysis reveals that when ICT prevails, military spending is negatively associated with the control of corruption, so that anti-corruption policies with the usage of ICT could reduce the extravagant budget allocation to military spending. Policymakers should associate sound ICT policy with traditional anti-corruption factors to bring more transparency and less corrupt behaviors in the military department. The reduction in the misuse of military allocation enables the country to increase nonmilitary public spending to face sustainable development challenges for the sake of the population.
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| 2 |
ID:
111872
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There has been an ongoing debate on whether dollarization helps stabilize exchange rates for emerging economies. This paper discusses this issue in a highly dollarized country, Cambodia, by empirically examining the relationship between dollarization and exchange rate movements. The GARCH analysis suggests that dollarization induces the depreciation of the Cambodian riel as well as intensifies exchange rate variability. The result is consistent with the argument that dollarization is one of the crucial causes of exchange rate instability. Dollarization in Cambodia could be a constraint on poverty reduction since it tends to affect the living standard of the poor who earn the income in the riel through the depreciation of the currency and intensified volatility of exchange rates.
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| 3 |
ID:
083232
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study provides an explanation of terrorism by examining interactions between the terrorist group with a minority as a potential pool of recruits and the government supported by a majority. A hawkish deterrence policy makes it more risky for terrorists to launch attacks, but heightens the anti-government feeling of the terrorist group. In addition, the payoff for the government depends not only on the payoff loss associated with the level of terrorism, but also on the political payoff from the action itself of adopting a hawk policy due to its politicians' vested interests. We first show that whether the deterrence policy should be 'hawk to 'dove is closely dependent on the relationships among the risk associated with terrorism, the anti-government feeling of the terrorist group, and the political payoff for the government. This study then introduces transnational support enhancing the capability of a terrorist group to intensify its activity and shows that the emergence of transnational support may cause the government to reform its deterrence policy from 'dove' toward 'hawk,' with terrorism intensified in the society
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