| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper considers the evolution of U.S. strategic arms policy after the end of the Cold War. It discusses the internal debates in the U.S. government concerning the structure and purpose of U.S. strategic nuclear forces in the context of strategic arms control agreements during the Clinton period and the reasons for the failure of significant reform. It examines the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review and the emergence of the "New Triad" involving strategic nuclear and conventional offensive strike systems, and active and passive defenses. It also analyzes the reorganization of the defense infrastructure in the context of an international environment in which "rogue states," regional conflicts and sub-state conflicts have become the main contingencies. The paper critically assesses the assumption of U.S. strategic arms policy and concludes that the full implementation of the "New Triad" is neither likely nor advisable, but that nuclear weapons should remain weapons of last resort to deter threats to the national survival of the United States.
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