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| 1 |
ID:
083402
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
After the September 11 attacks, Osama bin Laden launched a third front beyond Afghanistan and Iraq: his own homeland in Saudi Arabia. Saudi authorities have so far successfully countered al Qaeda's offensive, but the war inside the kingdom is far from over.
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| 2 |
ID:
188452
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| Summary/Abstract |
The main factors American presidents typically consider before committing military resources to protect a partner include perceived US national interests, US domestic politics, the nature of the attack itself, the aggressor’s military capabilities and the possibility of escalation. An additional factor is the ability and willingness of the partner to conduct joint and combined operations with the United States and possibly others. This is critically important in the Middle East. As Washington prioritises the Indo-Pacific and Europe, US military forces will draw down in the Middle East and be less able to intervene promptly. To maintain strong regional deterrence, security arrangements between the United States and its Arab partners should be reconfigured to ensure that they can confront regional threats, Iran’s in particular, without immediate American assistance. The will require American advice and assistance in creating sustainable and effective joint forces.
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| 3 |
ID:
173044
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| Summary/Abstract |
During three major crises, each happening under a different administration, the U.S.-Gulf partnership failed to effectively address the security concerns of the Gulf states. While no partnership is perfect, such major and persistent breakdowns in coordination among longstanding security partners are uncommon, and can be deadly if left unresolved.
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| 4 |
ID:
169190
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| 5 |
ID:
156276
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| 6 |
ID:
089089
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| Summary/Abstract |
Terrorist groups and armed insurgents regularly exploit illicit markets to launder money, traffic illegal goods, and purchase arms. In such an environment, the line between armed political organizations and criminal groups appears to break down. However, through a comparative study of paramilitary groups and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-FARC) in Colombia, this article finds that group goals, the political environment, and membership strongly influence the types of criminal activities a given armed groups undertakes. Thus, the membership and political agenda of sub-state armed groups not only distinguishes them from criminal groups-organized for and motivated by economic gain-but also shapes their criminal behavior.
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| 7 |
ID:
179826
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| Summary/Abstract |
With a new security-cooperation command, the United States could manage and coordinate US security cooperation globally and enhance institutional capacitybuilding with foreign partners.
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| 8 |
ID:
122168
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Political space is opening up in the Arab world. While it is particularly difficult to speak with any degree of confidence on the ultimate trajectory of the Arab uprisings (with all their local variants), the process of democratization that is sweeping the region is likely to have a significant impact on how Arab societies and their soon-to-be representative governments make and conduct foreign and defense policy in the future. One key area of concern is the subject of regional arms control and disarmament.
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