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| 1 |
ID:
148764
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| Summary/Abstract |
Contrary to its initiators’ intentions, the Cultural Revolution laid political foundations for a transition to a market-oriented economy whilst also creating circumstances that helped to ensure the cohesion and survival of China's Soviet-style party-state. The Cultural Revolution left the Chinese Communist Party and civilian state structures weak and in flux, and drastically weakened entrenched bureaucratic interests that might have blocked market reform. The weakening of central government structures created a decentralized planned economy, the regional and local leaders of which were receptive to initial market-oriented opportunities. The economic and technological backwardness fostered by the Cultural Revolution left little support for maintaining the status quo. Mao put Deng Xiaoping in charge of rebuilding the Party and economy briefly in the mid-1970s before purging him a second time, inadvertently making him the standard-bearer for post-Mao rebuilding and recovery. Mutual animosities with the Soviet Union provoked by Maoist polemics led to a surprising strategic turn to the United States and other Western countries in the early 1970s. The resulting economic and political ties subsequently advanced the agenda of reform and opening. China's first post-Mao decade was therefore one of rebuilding and renewal under a pre-eminent leader who was able to overcome opposition to a new course. The impact of this legacy becomes especially clear when contrasted with the Soviet Union in the 1980s, where political circumstances were starkly different, and where Gorbachev's attempts to implement similar changes in the face of entrenched bureaucratic opposition led to the collapse and dismemberment of the Soviet state.
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| 2 |
ID:
188386
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| Summary/Abstract |
International relations theory has had a trust revival, with scholars focusing on how trust can enhance interpersonal cooperation attempts between leaders. We propose there is another type of trust at play in world politics. International system trust is a feeling of confidence in the international social order, which is indexed especially by trust in its central unit, state persons. System trust anchors ontological security, and its presence is an unstated assumption of the international relations trust scholarship. In this paper we conceptualize system trust. We illuminate its presence by flagging the production of state personhood in a familiar case in international relations trust scholarship, the 1985 Geneva Summit between Reagan and Gorbachev. Interpersonal and system trust perspectives highlight different aspects of the same summit. The juxtaposition suggests new lines of research into the production of state persons in diplomacy, the relationship between interpersonal and system trust, and the impact of the rise of personalistic/patrimonial leadership on diplomacy and international order.
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| 3 |
ID:
106343
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was multiple, but the demise of the very economic system was one important component that in itself rendered its implosion inevitable, and with the Soviet collapse the Cold War came to a definite end. The purpose of this article is twofold, to depict this amazingly fast demise of a petrified economic system and to show how it was connected with the end of the Cold War. Today, the case for socialism is no longer persuasive, but it was not always so. Once, many intelligent people considered socialism not only morally but also economically superior to capitalism and democracy. They thought a benign state would pursue higher ideals than a petty democracy and execute them more effectively. In order to understand the demise of the socialist economic system, we need to comprehend its advantages as well as its drawbacks.
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| 4 |
ID:
118433
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As General Secretary, Gorbachev evolved from a Communist reformer to a socialist of the social democratic type. The most important programmatic documents of the CPSU in 1990-1991, on which Gorbachev had the predominant influence, were essentially social democratic. (Many in the Party apparatus had no intention of implementing them.) From 1988, Gorbachev was advocating fundamental change of the Soviet system, although there were zig-zags in his public pronouncements under the pressure of events. Ill-understood both at home and abroad, Gorbachev's social democratic ideas were 'outflanked' by the market fundamentalism and political impatience of his radical opponents and frustrated by the implacable enmity of conservative defenders of the vanishing Communist party-state.
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| 5 |
ID:
106344
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In a chapter, in Myths of Empire (1991), I argued that Gorbachev was seeking to transform atavistic ideas and institutions that had been functional for the initial stage of building socialism, but had become fetters on production and a danger to Soviet security. New concepts of international relations were needed to reduce the dangers and costs of the old confrontational mindset, and also to justify a shift in domestic arrangements away from the military industrial complex, central planning and obsessive secrecy. Together with the international contextual factors that helped to set this process in motion, this domestic political dynamic explains both the peaceful end of the cold war and also the collapse of the Soviet system, which was an unintended byproduct of the democratizing tactics that Gorbachev used to overcome resistance from the old-school military-industrial and ideological elites. These arguments are generally supported by recent accounts of the Soviet collapse and the end of the cold war.
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| 6 |
ID:
112962
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
At this point the ambitious Eurasian project promising to unite Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus into a single economic space is not so much an attempt to generate an original economic model and, consequently, an economic strategy, but rather is an attempt to integrate into an intensive exchange of commodities between the EU and Asia by offering a shorter route for cargo shipments.
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| 7 |
ID:
185470
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| 8 |
ID:
039497
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| Publication |
London, Croom Helm, 1987.
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| Description |
viii, 251p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
0709955065
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 028640 | 947.0854/MIL 028640 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
084523
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| 10 |
ID:
106340
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this essay, I make the case that the Cold War was caused by a competition of ideas rather than by a struggle for power or a failure of international institutions. The Cold War started when two sets of ideas diverged sufficiently - capitalism and communism - that they precluded either a realist - spheres of influence - or liberal - United Nations - solution to postwar differences in Europe. It ended when one set of ideas prevailed, and democracy and markets spread throughout the whole of Europe, eclipsing realist and liberal outcomes. The Soviet Union disappeared, which realists never expected; whereas the United Nations, which functioned briefly as a classic liberal collective security operation in the first Persian Gulf War, was quickly replaced by a democratic NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo. The competition of ideas did not end in the 1990s, however. It continues today in other forms and will shape the contours of military conflict and international cooperation in tomorrow's world, no less that it did during the Cold War.
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| 11 |
ID:
106346
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Reagan's rhetoric and actions in the arms race triggered considerable opposition, which was necessary to establish a counter-discourse in particular through the peace movements in the West, which then impacted upon the discussions in Moscow. It enabled Gorbachev to overcome his considerable domestic opposition and to make the necessary concessions, which started to bring the cold war to an end. In this sense, the peace movements won the cold war, too. The end of the cold war was as much a discursive struggle over ideas about international order and the right mix of deterrence and détente as the East-West conflict itself. It is a matter of good fortune that the cold war had a relatively happy ending and that Europe was reunited. Claiming victory for one side or the other seems to be beside the point, even 20 years later.
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| 12 |
ID:
143902
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| Summary/Abstract |
Trust is central to international politics. Trust-related theoretical arguments can be divided between rationalist, cultural and psychological schools. We present concise reviews of these approaches, emphasizing the initial trust-creation phase, and apply these factors to our historical case: the emergence of a fragile interpersonal trust between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan before and during their first meeting in Geneva in 1985. Based on archives and first-hand reminiscences, we conclude that the cultural trust theories are not able to contribute much to the initial trust-building process in this particular case, except for explaining the obstacles for trust. The rational approaches explain the necessary but not sufficient conditions for trust to emerge. Ultimately, what triggered the trust that ultimately ended the Cold War cannot be understood without taking into account the cognitive and psychological factors involved in this interpersonal relationship.
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| 13 |
ID:
095906
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia is often thought to be a classic case of the resource curse-the idea that natural resource wealth tends to impair democratic development.1 Some see the country as doomed to authoritarian politics by its enormous endowments of oil and gas. "Russia's future will be defined as much by the geology of its subsoil as by the ideology of its leaders," writes Moisés NaÃm, editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy magazine and former trade and industry minister of petroleum-rich Venezuela. "A lot of oil combined with weak public institutions produces poverty, inequality, and corruption. It also undermines democracy."2 New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman sees a close relationship between world commodity prices and the extent of liberty in resource-rich states: a higher oil price means less freedom. Friedman suggests that Russia, from Gorbachev to Putin, fits this relationship perfectly.
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| 14 |
ID:
066798
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| Publication |
New York, Scribner, 2005.
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| Description |
453p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
0743264312
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 050410 | 947.086/BAK 050410 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 15 |
ID:
106347
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the Cold War recedes, it becomes increasingly difficult to imagine what might have been and to objectively assess the contribution of Gorbachev's leadership and his legacy. Quite apart from the loss of a historic opportunity to build a radically different post-Cold War international relations, it is that the West did so in large measure out of an inability to understand that this was what, at least by 1989-1990, was central to Gorbachev's diplomacy. By focusing on our victory of superior power, and ignoring the role of Gorbachev's ideas, we ensured that what followed would indeed continue to be dominated by power politics. Once again, realism helps create the world it purports only to describe. By spurning Gorbachev's potentially greatest legacy as a twentieth-century leader, we ensured that this legacy would indeed be considerably less that it might have been.
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| 16 |
ID:
083438
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| Publication |
2008.
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In October 1987, during a visit to the Kola Peninsula, the Secretary-General of the Soviet Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, launched a series of policy initiatives which ultimately came to mark the beginning of the end of the Cold War era in the Arctic. The move was aimed at transforming the northern part of the globe from being a sensitive military theatre to becoming an international `zone of peace'. This objective was to be achieved through the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Northern Europe, restrictions on naval activities in Arctic seas, and the development of transborder cooperation in areas such as resource development, scientific exploration, indigenous people's affairs, environmental protection and marine transportation. This article analyses the contents of the Murmansk initiative, the context in which it was launched, the extent to which it materialized, and the degree to which it contributed to a normalization of interstate relations in the Arctic. In addition to being motivated by historical interest, the article aims at exploring the Copenhagen School concept of `desecuritization' and shedding light on the challenges and opportunities of turning security issues into non-security issues.
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| 17 |
ID:
095520
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the biggest sources of tension between the United States and Russia today is the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to countries that were either Moscow's allies in the Warsaw Pact or part of the Soviet Union itself. During the Cold War, Leningrad was roughly twelve hundred miles away from the edge of NATO; now (as St. Petersburg) it is less than a hundred, thanks to the membership of Estonia.1 Present-day Russian officials insist that the United States, by enabling and supporting this expansion, has broken promises made during the era of the George H. W. Bush presidency and German unification, when the Soviet Union came to an end.
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| 18 |
ID:
118432
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| 19 |
ID:
118435
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When Gorbachev came to power he inherited not simply a system in crisis, but a structure of symbols that was embedded within the broader political system and which was also in crisis. Given the ideocratic nature of the Soviet system, any change to that system would require symbolic change as well. This essay charts how Gorbachev sought to come to grips with this problem, investing some symbols with new meaning while rejecting others. It shows how ultimately he was unable to produce a new, coherent narrative.
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| 20 |
ID:
106342
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The security environment of the Soviet state during the Gorbachev period was distinctly different from earlier periods. The increased number of non-aggressive states in the Soviet Union's international environment further enhanced the security of the regime in historically unprecedented ways. Nuclear weapons freed the Soviet Union from fears of territorial aggression, while making its own expansion too costly. The achievement of military parity with the West gave the Soviets a further enhanced sense of security. Nuclear weapons also created significant common threats from nuclear war, providing strong incentives for accommodation and cooperation. Looking from the post-Cold War era, both Reagan and Gorbachev finally turned out to be anomalies. The particular circumstances that had created the opportunities for extraordinary breakthroughs by the diplomacy of these two men disappeared almost as quickly as they had arisen.
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