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| 1 |
ID:
083536
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many game-theoretic models of crisis bargaining find that under incomplete information, an initial offer is either accepted, or war occurs. However, this finding is odd in two ways: (a) empirically, there are many cases of an agreement being peacefully reached after a number of offers and counteroffers and (b) theoretically, it is not clear why a state would ever leave the bargaining table and opt for inefficient war. We analyze a model in which, as long as the dissatisfied state is not too impatient, equilibria exist in which an agreement is peacefully reached through the offer-counteroffer process. Our results suggest that private information only leads to war in conjunction with other factors that are correlated with impatience, such as domestic political vulnerability, exogenous obstacles to the ability to make counteroffers rapidly, and bargaining tactics that create incentives to strike quickly or that lock the actors into war.
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| 2 |
ID:
134092
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Screaming their defiant war cries, Scottish clansmen pointed their long spears and prepared to meet the English charge. The two armies came together in bloody combat, the helmeted English knights, slowed by their cumbersome armor, outmaneuvered by the more agile, more lightly armed Scots, and eventually overwhelmed. When the English drew back, leaving hundreds of dead and wounded on the field, the screaming clansmen charged, turning the enemy's disciplined retreat into a rout.
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| 3 |
ID:
023770
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| Publication |
DelhI, Oxford University Press, 1976.
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| Description |
398p.Hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 015530 | 923.254/GOP 015530 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
133409
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A mine is a terrible thing that waits. The easy way is always mined. Any ship can be a minesweeper-once. Sea mines and the need to counter them have been constants for the U.S. Navy since the earliest days of the Republic. In January 1778, patriot David Bushnell used floating kegs of gunpowder fitted with contact firing mechanisms to attack a British fleet anchored in the Delaware River above Philadelphia. Four British sailors died trying to retrieve the kegs-an early example of the challenges of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) against an unknown threat-but the ships were unscathed. Since that uncertain beginning, mines and mine countermeasures (MCM) have figured prominently in the Civil War, Spanish-American War, both world wars, Korea, Vietnam, numerous Cold War crises, and Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM.
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