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Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
083647
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Publication |
2008.
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Summary/Abstract |
After the defeat of the Taliban, Afghanistan entered a period of constitutional flux. The 2004 Constitution rejected formal ethnic representation in state institutions. This Constitution, therefore, provides no defense against perceived or actual domination of the state by any one particular ethnic community. This could lead to increased ethnic resentment and conflicts.
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2 |
ID:
121089
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
Ethnic quotas are often expected to induce distribution of material benefits to members of disadvantaged groups. Yet, the presence of an ethnic quota does not imply that political mobilization takes place along ethnic lines: Cross-cutting affiliations within multi-ethnic party organizations may lessen the tendency of politicians to target benefits to particular ethnic groups. In this article, we evaluate the impact of quotas for the presidencies of village councils in India, a subject of considerable recent research. Drawing on fine-grained information from surveys of voters, council members, presidents, and bureaucrats and using a natural experiment to isolate the effects of quotas in the states of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Bihar, we find weak distributive effects of quotas for marginalized castes and tribes, but suggestive evidence of the importance of partisanship. We then use survey experiments to compare the influence of party and caste on voting preferences and expectations of benefit receipt. Our results suggest that especially when politicians have dynamic political incentives to allocate benefits along party lines, cross-cutting partisan ties can blunt the distributive impact of ethnic quotas.
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3 |
ID:
190078
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Summary/Abstract |
Building on an original dataset, this paper explores the evolution of the consociational power- sharing at critical junctures in Burundi. Covering almost two decades of power-sharing practice (2001–2020), this paper analyzes the allocation of high salience ministerial portfolios and of provincial governor positions along ethnic lines. The paper shows how quotas matter and how a changing political context affects the real life implementation of Burundi’s negotiated power-sharing arrangements. We argue that dominant political actors take advantage of loopholes in the design of power-sharing institutions in order to enhance their access to important political positions.
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4 |
ID:
145756
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Summary/Abstract |
In Singapore, the percentage of elected female politicians rose from 3.8 percent in 1984 to 22.5 percent after the 2015 general election. After years of exclusion, why were gender reforms adopted and how did they lead to more women in political office? Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, this paper shows that in Singapore party pragmatism rather than international diffusion of gender equality norms, feminist lobbying, or rival party pressures drove gender reforms. It is argued that the ruling People’s Action Party’s (PAP) strategic and electoral calculations to maintain hegemonic rule drove its policy u-turn to nominate an average of about 17.6 percent female candidates in the last three elections. Similar to the PAP’s bid to capture women voters in the 1959 elections, it had to alter its patriarchal, conservative image to appeal to the younger, progressive electorate in the 2000s. Additionally, Singapore’s electoral system that includes multi-member constituencies based on plurality party bloc vote rule also makes it easier to include women and diversify the party slate. But despite the strategic and electoral incentives, a gender gap remains. Drawing from a range of public opinion data, this paper explains why traditional gender stereotypes, biased social norms, and unequal family responsibilities may hold women back from full political participation.
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