|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
116671
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
153391
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Immediately after Xi Jinping assumed the position of party secretary general, he launched a large-scale top-down antiwaste campaign amongst the Chinese cadre corps. Compared with similar policies announced by Xi’s predecessors, this campaign has distinct features that entail substantial political risk for the party secretary general. Why did Xi choose this politically risky strategy? Drawing on recent literature on authoritarian regimes, this article argues that, amongst all possible objectives, an authoritarian leader such as Xi can use this type of policy campaign to demonstrate his power. In particular, the inherent importance of informal politics, the recent developments in Chinese politics, and Xi’s personal background have increased his incentive and capacity to signal power by implementing such a campaign. A comparison with Xi’s two predecessors, interviews, and statistical analyses support this argument. The theoretical framework of this article also sheds light on the literature on the power sharing of authoritarian political elites.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
124166
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
What does a rising China mean to the world? While some countries take China as a salient threat, others regard China as their role model for development and governance. However, limited research has offered a systematic comparative analysis in this regard. China's spectacular celebration of its 60th anniversary uniquely showcased its increasing military might, mounting economic wealth and carefully-maintained mass support. Taking advantage of simultaneous worldwide news coverage of this all-in-one event, we scrutinize how different societies responded to a rising China. We find significant variance in the news coverage from 42 top printed media in 21 sampled societies. Moreover, these societies' political features affect their newspapers' reporting styles the most. This analysis significantly enriches our understanding of the rise of China.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
128940
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Extant literature on authoritarian legislatures argues that dictators set up quasi-democratic institutions to co-opt opposition and attract investors. We argue that dictators also nurture clientelistic ties with social groups useful to their rule, a previously overlooked function of authoritarian legislatures. Drawing on the case of Chinese local legislatures-namely, the local People's Congress and the local People's Political Consultative Conference-we find that Chinese local governments use these institutions to channel patronage to and gain political support from the private sector. Field interviews and an analysis of a nationwide firm-level survey show that private firms owned by local legislative members, while obtaining more bank loans, provide more support to the local government in various forms than those owned by nonmembers. This finding suggests that authoritarian legislatures, even those with weak policymaking efficacy, can help authoritarian states build stable alliances with social groups, thereby contributing to regime resilience.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
179169
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Individuals who take advantage of global networks to flee abroad with allegedly corrupt proceeds comprise an important yet understudied group of corruption suspects. We characterize them as “globalized corruption fugitives” and, using the case of China, investigate how they take advantage of international loopholes. Under President Xi Jinping, China actively began to pursue such suspects. Our analysis of their backgrounds and how they evade repatriation to China is based mainly on a list of China’s 100 wanted fugitives issued through Interpol Red Notices, supplemented with interviews and documentary data. We find that (1) unexpectedly, government officials did not comprise the majority in the sample; rather, state-owned companies and financial institutions, especially those based in coastal regions, seem to breed fugitive corruption suspects; (2) a tremendous amount of capital has been laundered; (3) Western countries are the most popular destinations of these fugitives, due in part to the protection against repatriation of these countries’ legal systems; and (4) Hong Kong serves as a distinct transit point for fugitives from the PRC’s justice system. This research highlights the transnational dimension of such corruption cases.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
184999
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
A new term, “political corruption,” emerged in the Chinese Communist Party discourse during President Xi Jinping’s corruption crackdown. To understand why this type of corruption is particularly unacceptable to the Party, I apply Winters’s theory of oligarchy to encapsulate a group of Chinese high-level political elites who leveraged their political power for massive material wealth through corrupt measures. I argue that these oligarchs had to defend both wealth and political power in the context of the single-party authoritarian regime. Their intent and capacity for the double defense, however, can pose a threat to the regime and pave the way to their downfall. Two high-profile cases further show how different career tracks provide power resources politicians can use to ascend to the level of oligarchs. This research draws attention to concept adaptation in corruption crackdowns in China and enriches oligarchical theory by signifying the logic of double defense for using political power as the steppingstone to oligarchic power.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
110013
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Corruption in the Chinese real estate (RE) industry is a very serious and prevalent issue. This article focuses on variations in Chinese RE corruption. It argues that due to an expansion of the official players at each step in the RE development process, corruption is an unintended consequence of the reform to regulate the industry. Despite the empowerment of local governments and bureaucracies, corruption has emerged in these entities, spreading from local people's governments to functional units, creating a chain of corrupt practices which includes groups of officials and large sums of money.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
187931
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Corrupt officials fleeing abroad with ill-gotten proceeds constitute a special challenge for the Chinese government. International cooperation to seize these fugitives often encounters roadblocks due to countries’ legal-political differences. By observing China’s burgeoning extraterritorial anti-corruption regime, this article proposes that an anti-money laundering (AML) mindset is being embraced to ‘seize the fugitives’ by ‘tracing the money’. This approach has three advantages: 1) de-complication by standardizing states’ practices and bypassing complexities inherent in orthodox means, 2) de-politicization by circumventing sensitive political concerns through pursuing fugitives and corrupt proceeds separately, and 3) leveling the playing field by rebalancing power between requested and requesting states. In-depth case studies combined with elite interviews reveal that this AML-oriented tactic has facilitated China’s capture of fugitives on foreign soils.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
083648
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2008.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes how and why buying and selling offices (BSO) has re-emerged in China since the 1990s, from the perspective of demand and supply in a case study. The major causes are the weaknesses of the Chinese cadre management systems-concentration of power over personnel issues and the difficulties of monitoring top administrators
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|