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| 1 |
ID:
083358
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes China's changing elite politics in the Hu Jintao era with a focus on the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held in October 2007. The Congress addressed the two issues of personnel reshuffles (including leadership transition) and policy changes. Both issues are considered to be the most vital and sensitive elements of China's elite politics. Therefore, the 17th Party Congress is an important window through which China's changing elite politics in the Hu era can be assessed. This article examines, first, two critical trends of elite politics in the Jiang and Hu eras. Then, it analyzes the main features of personnel changes at the Congress. Third, it delves into the revision of the Party Constitution as a case study of changing Party policy. Finally, this article discusses the relevance and limits of factionalism in analyzing Chinese politics. Based on these analyses, it posits that the personnel reshuffles and the changes of Party policy at the 17th Party Congress confirm the two main trends of China's elite politics: the formation of collective leadership based on power-sharing between major informal groups (factions) and the enlargement of intra-party democracy or elite democracy.
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| 2 |
ID:
083357
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
By reviewing the development of relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan up to the present, since Korea was liberated from Japan's colonial rule, the author will show that changes in the security environment have gradually raised the importance of ROK-Japan security cooperation. South Korea and Japan, both allied to the United States, shared the common goal of defending their society from the communist threat, but their dedication to democratic values was not imminent enough to outweigh their past history. After the demise of the Soviet threat in Northeast Asia, the rationale for South Korean-Japanese security cooperation is to be found in their joint contribution to handle comprehensive security threats in the region, including the issues of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, confidence-building, environmental and energy security, etc. The future of the South Korean-Japanese relationship depends on whether the two sides can build a future-oriented relationship as they move to remedy the past. ROK-Japan relations, the weakest link of the trilateral security relations among the United States, Korea, and Japan, may not override the importance of the Korea-U.S. and the U.S.-Japan alliances due to the geostrategic conditions that confine Korean and Japanese foreign policy. Nevertheless, their common views of democracy and the market economy will continue to bind them together throughout the twenty-first century.
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| 3 |
ID:
083359
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There are two regular regional security organizations in Asia-the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)-through which regional states are involved in managing security pertaining to Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific, respectively. Since 2001, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders' meetings have addressed aspects of economic security. Whereas the SCO seems well institutionalized and purposeful, the ARF appears weakly structured and ineffective. This is because, while member states of the SCO are generally trustful of one another and hold in common most security objectives, concerns, and norms in the organization, many member states of the ARF have uneasy relations among themselves and share few security objectives, concerns, and norms in the forum. Moreover, while the SCO represents priority multilateral foreign and security policy interests for the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, its two most important constituents, the ARF represents a secondary or fall-back position for the bilateral-first foreign and security policy relations of its major players like Japan, United States, and the PRC
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| 4 |
ID:
083355
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the outlook for North Korea's economic and political future. It argues that North Korea will most probably meet its demise in the same way as did the former Soviet Union. That is, an economic implosion will occur causing the political collapse of North Korea. Contrary to popular belief that North Korea would sustain itself if it reformed its economic policies, this paper argues that, regardless of reform, North Korea will not be able to avoid the collapse of the state-and the Kim regime, for that matter. The only impact reform will have is with regard to time as it will merely delay the process of North Korea's collapse. The author wishes to stress that these assessments of North Korea's future will probably show a greater impact after Kim Jong Il has passed. It is unlikely that North Korea or the regime will collapse under Kim Jong Il's reign because his regime still has a strong authoritative grip over his state, which he controls by being the commander of the North Korean People's Army and various paramilitary apparatuses, and by control of the media. However, the decisions that Kim Jong Il makes now will be the indirect cause of various unintended consequences in the future. Once the economy of North Korea develops core values that are somewhat similar to the South's, it is highly likely that Seoul, with its economic leverage, will gain political leverage over Pyongyang. This will ultimately have its effects in reunifying the Korean peninsula under Seoul's terms after Kim Jong Il's passing. The author reiterates that both, the status quo or the reform option, will eventually lead to the North's collapse. The difference will be in regard to when.
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| 5 |
ID:
083356
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper considers the evolution of U.S. strategic arms policy after the end of the Cold War. It discusses the internal debates in the U.S. government concerning the structure and purpose of U.S. strategic nuclear forces in the context of strategic arms control agreements during the Clinton period and the reasons for the failure of significant reform. It examines the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review and the emergence of the "New Triad" involving strategic nuclear and conventional offensive strike systems, and active and passive defenses. It also analyzes the reorganization of the defense infrastructure in the context of an international environment in which "rogue states," regional conflicts and sub-state conflicts have become the main contingencies. The paper critically assesses the assumption of U.S. strategic arms policy and concludes that the full implementation of the "New Triad" is neither likely nor advisable, but that nuclear weapons should remain weapons of last resort to deter threats to the national survival of the United States.
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