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1 |
ID:
095425
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Publication |
2010.
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Summary/Abstract |
There is potent irony in the fact that 68,000 American troops, with 30,000 more to come, are fighting and dying in Afghanistan, a landlocked country at the crossroads of South and Central Asia from which the United States worked so vigorously to oust the Soviets during the Cold War, and in which a predominant majority of those the United States now confronts have views and values akin to those it supported during that prior conflict. But then history in Afghanistan is ironic at its core and has a way of mocking the best laid of plans.
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2 |
ID:
083668
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Publication |
2008.
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Summary/Abstract |
After the U.S. led coalition forces attacked Al Qaeda and Taliban infrastructure in Afghanistan beginning in October 2001, the epicenter of global terrorism moved from Afghanistan to tribal Pakistan. Known as the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in Pakistan, this region has emerged as the premier hunting ground for the Al Qaeda leadership. With the co-option of new groups in FATA and its adjacent North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), the Al Qaeda threat has proliferated. The threat posed by the Afghan Taliban has been compounded with the addition of a new range of actors notably the Pakistani Taliban. Working together with multiple threat groups, both foreign and Pakistani, Al Qaeda directs its global jihad campaign from FATA. Unless the terrorist enclave is cleared on the Afghan-Pakistan border, the threat to Afghanistan and mainland Pakistan will continue. This article seeks to map the evolution of Al Qaeda and its associated groups since their relocation to FATA.
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3 |
ID:
087797
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
That the Taliban presence in the NWFP has spread to newer areas is evident from the fact that they have moved from South Waziristan in March 2004, when the first military action was launched against them, to each one of the seven tribal agencies and to several settled districts of the province.
In fact, the Taliban's strength grew in the aftermath of every operation by the Pakistan Army in the tribal or settled areas. Rather than defeating the militants and regaining lost territory, almost all the military operations were followed by controversial peace deals that gave legitimacy to the Taliban and recognised their status and power. With every passing year, the Taliban managed to extend their control to more territory at the expense of the government. The weaker government writ meant that the common people had little or no option but to turn to the armed Taliban for protection and solution of their problems. The Taliban leadership responded by setting up their courts to dispense justice and established a parallel administration.
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4 |
ID:
096053
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5 |
ID:
119588
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6 |
ID:
120056
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7 |
ID:
127950
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8 |
ID:
126297
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9 |
ID:
048188
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Publication |
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999.
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Description |
liv, 311p.hbk
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Standard Number |
0195790502
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
042771 | 954.91/SHA 042771 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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10 |
ID:
128750
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11 |
ID:
086040
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
With the Taliban in control of most of the once pristine Swat valley, locals , politics and security forces are demoralised ,fearful and feuding about the best future action
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12 |
ID:
052561
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Publication |
Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2002.
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Description |
xv, 295p.Hbk
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Standard Number |
0195796462
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
048267 | 920.72/SHA 048267 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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13 |
ID:
095773
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14 |
ID:
088306
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
In the backdrop of massive bombings of girls' school in Swat, pakistan,
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15 |
ID:
092672
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16 |
ID:
047436
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Publication |
New Delhi, Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 2000.
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Description |
x, 440p.Hbk
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Standard Number |
8170621062
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
043344 | 923.554/SIN 043344 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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17 |
ID:
036650
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Publication |
DelhI, H K Publishers, 1990.
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Description |
412p.Hbk
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Contents |
Vol.3: 1923-28
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Standard Number |
8185318301
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
031751 | 923.2/BAK 031751 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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18 |
ID:
182851
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Summary/Abstract |
According to Police Special Branch intelligence reports, amidst the chaos of Partition, over 60,000 ounces of gold were stolen from fleeing Hindus and Sikhs in 1947. Alongside political identity and religious organisation and territorialisation, desire for wealth or property was a key trigger for the continuation of the Partition violence. This article documents organised communal violence which erupted in the NWFP and Punjab during 1946–47 using largely underutilised police and intelligence reports from the period. The empirical focus of the article is two-fold. First, to show that the intercommunity violence triggered in these provinces was organised and funded by the Muslim League through its volunteer wings, even if specific perpetrators were locals. Second, that looting was a feature of locally-rooted violence to acquire property owned by non-Muslim minorities. As well, individual motives for revenge or a desire to best one’s business rival fuelled the violence alongside ideological imperatives such as the commitment to the idea of Pakistan.
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19 |
ID:
095391
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20 |
ID:
092189
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
Pakistan today is confronted with two insurgencies on its flanks in the north-west and the south-west.The Baloch insurgency in Balochistan and Pakistan insurgency in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) are qualitatively different in several respects, yet they represent the same version or justification for their ethnic sub-nationalism and religious reassertion against the centre.
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