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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
179017
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| Summary/Abstract |
British and Italian representatives signed a series of accords, commonly called the Easter Accords, on 16 April 1938. The various agreements aimed to settle several outstanding issues between the two governments and, on the surface, it appeared that both Powers had committed to observe the status quo in the Mediterranean. Two years later, however, fascist Italy and Britain were at war. This analysis argues that Italian foreign policy had three over-arching goals that led Rome to sign the Accords. It wanted to secure definitive British de jure recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and recognition that Italy was an equal empire with rights in the Mediterranean and Red Sea basins. Benito Mussolini, the Italian dictator, wanted to isolate France from its potential British ally. Italian diplomats and officials also thought that they could use the negotiations to weaken the influence of Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary. The limited, tactical scope of Italian policy meant little chance existed of reaching a genuine rapprochement.
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| 2 |
ID:
097157
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Peace Treaty of 1947 required Italy to renounce sovereignty over its former colonies. Italy and Britain, although NATO allies, bitterly disputed the disposition of Tripolitania and Eritrea. The Italian government sent agents to Tripoli and Asmara to influence local populations in favour of its policy of independence for both regions. The agents ran espionage operations: developing networks of agents, purloining documents, bribing officials, and channeling illegal funds to local political parties. Dr Matteo Gallimberti, the Italian agent in Tripoli, faced accusations that he was embezzling funds. After he committed suicide in January 1950, local British military authorities discovered the full range of his illegal activities. Rather than publicly embarrass the Italian government, British Foreign Office officials coerced concessions from the Italian government in exchange for keeping the potential scandal concealed. The affair demonstrates the fractious nature of Anglo-Italian relations within the framework of the NATO alliance and the respective foreign policy-making elites' differing and self-interested approaches to development and security issues in Africa.
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| 3 |
ID:
083682
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The British government's appeasement of fascism in the 1930s derived not only from economic, political, and strategic constraints, but also from the personal ideologies of the policy makers. Widespread guilt about the terms of the Versailles Treaty and tensions with France created sympathy for German revisionism, but the Cabinet properly recognized that Nazi Germany represented the gravest threat to peace in the 1930s. Fear of war and the recognition that Britain would have to tolerate peaceful change underlay attempts to appease the dictators, culminating in the Munich agreement in September 1938. After Munich, continued German belligerence, the Kristallnacht, and British intelligence assessments indicating that Hitler was prepared to attack the Western powers led to a reassessment of appeasement. The British government gave security guarantees to several European countries, seeking to deter future aggression and to lay the groundwork for a successful war against Germany should it prove necessary. While most of the British elite detested communism, anti-communist views did not govern British policy; security considerations required Soviet support in Eastern Europe, and Britain and France made a determined effort to secure Soviet support for the Peace Front
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