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| 1 |
ID:
145195
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the narrowest of terms, European security and defence are areas in which a British exit from the European Union would have comparatively little effect. Despite the launching in 19981 by France and the United Kingdom of what soon became a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, subsequently the Common Security and Defence Policy or CSDP),2 Britain ceased to invest politically or military in the ESDP in any substantial manner from the Iraq crisis of 2002–03 onwards. Nor has the ESDP/CSDP developed beyond a number of generally successful but quite limited operations, including the ongoing anti-piracy mission in the Indian Ocean: it has remained stuck at a low plateau ever since the economic crisis of 2008 forced other matters to the top of the EU’s agenda. The UK has pointedly disassociated itself from any broader European dimension, focusing instead on the strong and strictly bilateral relationship built with France in the field of conventional and nuclear defence since the signing of the Lancaster House treaties in 2010.3 Unlike the single market or other areas in which sovereignty is shared with the European institutions, defence and security are not caught in a complex web of intertwined national and supranational competences. There is no European omelette here to unscramble in case of a ‘Brexit’.
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| 2 |
ID:
151605
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| Summary/Abstract |
The analogy between the US president and German emperor works because of similar institutional and international realities, and because personality matters.
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| 3 |
ID:
181687
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| Summary/Abstract |
As China has emerged over the past decade as a peer competitor of the United States, the bilateral relationship has become confrontational. Given the relatively wide range of possible strategic outcomes, Europe’s primary task is to organise itself for uncertainty. It must also assume that the US will react negatively if Europe is seen as running counter to America’s policy in the Indo-Pacific and build resilience into its policies to deal with sudden shifts in US policy. Europe’s overarching aims should be defending itself against a revisionist Russia, insulating Europe against direct Chinese coercion, helping like-minded countries prevent China from overwhelming the rules-based international order and avoiding a major war between nuclear powers. Despite the acrimony in the China–US relationship, the fear of nuclear annihilation that helped keep the Cold War cold is notably absent. Trust, especially among allies, is therefore paramount.
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| 4 |
ID:
177910
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| Summary/Abstract |
A convincing, rapidly deployable, conventional counter-offensive capability may have greater deterrent value than a purely defensive force.
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| 5 |
ID:
162720
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| Summary/Abstract |
A United Kingdom semi-detached from Europe would be a minus for the continent, but a deterioration of Europe’s security would also hurt the UK’s safety.
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| 6 |
ID:
083754
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| 7 |
ID:
176514
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| Summary/Abstract |
The COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced the power of the state in its traditional role as protector of society from outside threats.
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| 8 |
ID:
172486
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| Summary/Abstract |
It will be no mean feat to keep US and European decisions relating to China in close enough coordination to prevent a collapse of the transatlantic defence relationship.
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