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ID:
083954
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The dramatic movements of China's stock market in the past two and a half years have renewed debate among academics over the efficiency of China's stock market. The present paper tests the efficiency of China's stock market. The realization of efficient markets requires the effective operation of a complete set of macro and micro mechanisms. However, such mechanisms are not only incomplete in China's stock market, but are also ineffective because of the prevalence of institutional deficiencies.
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| 2 |
ID:
095934
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates tunneling by controlling shareholders in China's public companies, and finds that, first, tunneling is pervasive and severe; and, second, private controlling ownership significantly increases the severity of tunneling. This article argues that in China, where there is not sufficient and effective legal protection for investors, controlling shareholders, especially shareholders of privately controlled public companies, are able to conduct tunneling at minimal costs. Further, corporate governance mechanisms alone are not sufficient to protect minority shareholders.
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| 3 |
ID:
143435
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| Summary/Abstract |
Using hand-collected data on IPOs by private-owned enterprises, this article examines the regulatory benefits of political connections in China's state-controlled going public process, a subject that has rarely been investigated in existing literature. This article makes the following findings: first, political connections have significant positive impact on enterprises' chances of being approved for IPOs; second, enterprises with political connections are significantly more likely to receive preferential treatments (e.g., higher offering price-to-earning ratio) from regulatory authorities; third, enterprises with political connections are significantly less likely to be selected for pre-IPO on-site auditing by regulatory authorities. The findings of this article may provide answer to the question why China has been so reluctant to adopt disclosure-based regulatory regime as well as insights into the puzzle of the consistent poor performance of China's stock markets.
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| 4 |
ID:
144571
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| Summary/Abstract |
The paradox that the performance of China’s stock market has not matched the performance of China’s real economy has been puzzling. This article argues that one of the major causes of the poor performance of China’s stock markets is that ever since their establishment, China’s stock markets have been systematically politicized by the ruling party to promote its political agenda. The mantra of ‘socialism’ of the ruling party has turned the stock markets into a mere fund-raising vehicle largely for failing state-owned enterprises, with investors’ interests being only a secondary consideration. The regulation of stock markets is subject to the principle of maintaining one-party ruling. Such a systematic politicization of stock markets has caused some serious consequences for China’s stock markets and economic growth.
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