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ID:
037663
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| Publication |
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1979.
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| Description |
vii, 181p.
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| Standard Number |
0226134083
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 019055 | 301/DAH 019055 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
141151
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2013, France launched Operation ‘Serval’ to halt the southwards advance of Islamist insurgents in Mali. Using a Clausewitzian analytical framework, this article provides an assessment of France’s political and military aims in Mali and the degree to which they have been attained. Clear political goals, coordinated international diplomacy, an effective use of military force and blunders by the rebel forces turned ‘Serval’ into a short-term success. Strategically, however, the mission has proven unable to address the conflict’s underlying causes. Serval’s long-term effect is probably better measured by what it prevented than what it contributed.
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| 3 |
ID:
086063
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