| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
If crime corrupts the credibility of paramilitary to political organizations, at what stage in the process of transition from paramilitary to parliamentary organization do violence and corruption become increasingly objectionable? What mechanisms institute credible organizational change?
Moreover, what mechanisms are most likely to impede organizational transformation and determine the degree to which criminal-military elements are successfully pacified by the political process? This paper addresses the protagonists' problem of curtailing criminality, clientelism, corruption and long standing predation in protracted peace processes. The findings suggest that the nature of corruption can determine the duration of the transition.
The prevalence of criminality clientelism, patronage, or predation is determined by the organizational structure of the group. The more 'monolithic', cohesive and integrated the rebel-to-political group, the more seamless the evolution from paramilitary-to-parliamentary.
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