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| 1 |
ID:
181129
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| Summary/Abstract |
States accused of perpetrating cyber operations typically do not confirm or deny responsibility. They issue ‘non-denial denials’ or refuse to comment on the accusations. These ambiguous signals are prevalent, but they are largely ignored in the existing cyber literature, which tends to treat credit claiming as a binary choice. The ambiguity of non-denial denials and ‘non-comments’ allows states to accomplish two seemingly opposed goals: maintaining crisis stability and leaving open the possibility of their involvement in the attack. By deliberately remaining a suspect, a state can manipulate rivals’ perceptions of its cyber capability and resolve. Refusing to deny responsibility can also shape rivals’ perceptions of allies’ capabilities, enhancing the credibility of deterrence. All of this can be accomplished without the escalatory risks that would come with an explicit admission of responsibility. Where previous research has focused on the dangers of escalation and the limitations of costly signalling with cyber, we show that non-denial denials and non-comments make cyber operations considerably more useful than the literature appreciates.
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| 2 |
ID:
120284
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article distills insights for the scholarship of deterrence by examining the 1983 nuclear crisis - the moment of maximum danger of the late Cold War. Important contributions notwithstanding, our understanding of this episode still has caveats, and a significant pool of theoretical lessons for strategic studies remain to be learned. Utilizing newly available sources, this article suggests an alternative interpretation of Soviet and US conduct. It argues that the then US deterrence strategy almost produced Soviet nuclear overreaction by nearly turning a NATO exercise into a prelude to a preventive Soviet attack. Building on historical findings, this article offers insights about a mechanism for deterrence effectiveness evaluation, recommends establishing a structure responsible for this endeavor, and introduces a new theoretical term to the strategic studies lexicon - a 'culminating point of deterrence'.
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| 3 |
ID:
079217
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Public discussion about the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks has focused on the human causes of tragedy - on individual mistakes, failures of leadership, and the power plays between intelligence officers in the field and policymakers in Washington. But closer examination of the FBI suggests that organizational weaknesses are the root cause of poor agency performance. Longstanding deficiencies in the FBI's organizational structure, culture, and incentive systems proved crippling in the 1990s, when the Cold War ended and the terrorist threat emerged. These lingering weaknesses ultimately prevented the bureau from capitalizing on 12 separate opportunities that might have disrupted the 9/11 plot
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| 4 |
ID:
087393
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. were undoubtedly the most brazen and shocking terrorist attacks conducted by a sub-state group in history. Al Qaeda's capacity to achieve this outcome depended in large part on its meticulous intelligence and counterintelligence preparations. These activities allowed Al Qaeda to exert a strong measure of control over its operating environment, leading to a confidence that events would unfold as planned. Moreover, intelligence and counterintelligence allowed Al Qaeda to form highly accurate and realistic assessments of its environment, an outcome that helps to dispel notions of an organization consumed by a level of fanaticism that distorts its perception of reality, or else frustrates its capacity to engage in rational decision making
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| 5 |
ID:
060745
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| Publication |
Winter 2004-05.
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| 6 |
ID:
109887
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| 7 |
ID:
051550
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| 8 |
ID:
084728
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| 9 |
ID:
082818
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| 10 |
ID:
137939
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article aims to encourage the fostering of more systems thinking, and its greater exploitation, within the domain of contemporary intelligence. With particular focus on “micro systems thinking” and with reference to key intelligence processes, such as intelligence analysis, the utility of many systems dynamics within the intelligence context seeks to be further revealed. Through their greater collective harnessing, including up to “System of Systems” (“SoS”) dynamics, and promoting all that they can offer, more sophisticated overarching operational-to-strategic/policy “ends,” notably that of “defence-indepth,” can be viably further advanced in a sustainable manner into the future. Arguably, a much-needed transformative impact on contemporary intelligence can also be increasingly realised through comprehensively engaging in and with more systems and SoS thinking. Aiding civil protection tasks, crisis management, emergency planners, and civil contingency practitioners likewise gain.
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| 11 |
ID:
106607
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent discussions among U.S. officials about how the intelligence community can demonstrate its "relevance" to counterinsurgency have been dominated by an ideology that presupposes large-scale military intervention, and in which the role of intelligence is limited to improving analysis in support of current military activities, with little debate of future requirements. This article will highlight a number of alternative conceptions of intelligence "relevance" to counterinsurgency, based on a study of several historical and contemporary U.S. and non-U.S. cases, and by applying a wider definition of counterinsurgency that includes cases where the military plays a subordinate role relative to the intelligence services.
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| 12 |
ID:
131220
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| 13 |
ID:
139649
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| 14 |
ID:
051551
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| 15 |
ID:
082813
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| 16 |
ID:
068952
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| 17 |
ID:
140496
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article describes a new effort to engage in analytic outreach between academic scholars and intelligence analysts on the issue of emerging biotechnology threats to US national security. The context of this outreach was a September 2012 meeting in London to explore possibilities for enhanced analytic outreach in relation to emerging biotechnology threats, supported by the UK Genomics Policy and Research Forum. This meeting consisted of a mix of current and former intelligence practitioners and policy officials, and social science and scientific experts, from both the UK and the US. As will be described below, this unique pairing of experts and subjects revealed new insights into how to improve intelligence assessments on biotechnology and bioweapons threats. It also revealed continuing challenges in reforming assessments within existing intelligence work routines.
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| 18 |
ID:
087064
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Intelligence analysts generally encounter a wide of items of evidence provided by an array of sources. Some are human assets or informants; others are sensing devices of various kinds. Of great concern is the extent to which the events revealed in these evidence items can be believed. That the information received has been deliberately contrived to mislead is always possible.
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| 19 |
ID:
069400
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| 20 |
ID:
097151
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that foreign languages are another part of the 'missing dimension' of intelligence. By examining the role of linguists in Y stations and at Bletchley Park in the Second World War, the article explores the institutional language policies developed for intelligence, and the working practices of those with foreign language skills. The article suggests that certain issues raised by this case study might be usefully examined in other intelligence contexts: the ways in which foreign language requirements are officially represented, the problematics of foreignness for recruiters, the status and identities of language workers, and the implications of professional translation practice within an intelligence environment.
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