| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
014130
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| Publication |
1992.
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| Description |
168-182
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| 2 |
ID:
188865
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| Summary/Abstract |
Under what conditions do countries form confidence building measures (CBMs)
in the cyber domain? How do those conditions affect the frequency and type of
cyber CBMs (CCBMs)? The extant literature surveys existing CCBMs, providing
fragmented pictures of them at either the global, regional, or bilateral levels.
Thus, there is a lack of systematically comparative perspectives between multiple
efforts for states’ cyber confidence–building. This deficiency implies that little
to no research has been dedicated to analytical examinations of the development
of CCBMs. The present article offers a framework to assess the development
and theoretical arguments to understand its underlying causes. It argues that the
willingness of political leaders affected by the international strategic–security
context is a necessary condition, in addition to the cost-benefit calculation of
policymakers, affecting the frequency and type of CCBMs. To examine the
arguments, the present article overviews the global development of the discussion
of CCBMs at the UNGGE and OEWG. Then it presents the networks of CCBMs
in Northeast Asia where the staunchest alliances as well as fierce strategic–security
competitions have taken hold in the emergence of the new cyber domain. Lastly,
the article investigates the processes of bilateral CCBMs formation in three dyads
between the United States and each of three states, namely, Russia, China, and
Japan. The empirical findings support the theoretical arguments
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| 3 |
ID:
009521
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| Publication |
Dec 1995.
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| Description |
267-298
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| 4 |
ID:
072589
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| 5 |
ID:
122351
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It is very hard - in most cases impossible - to track down the source of a cyber attack. Since the U.S. and Russia have reserved the right to respond to cyber incidents like they were conventional acts of aggression, the two countries must work out confidence-building measures.
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| 6 |
ID:
046556
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Atlantic publishers and distributors, 1999.
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| Description |
xvi, 109p.
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| Standard Number |
8171568092
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 045475 | 355.825119/GUP 045475 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
023423
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| Publication |
Oct-Dec 2002.
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| Description |
546-557
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| 8 |
ID:
064819
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| Publication |
Apr-Jun 2005.
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| 9 |
ID:
098081
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| 10 |
ID:
009303
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| Publication |
Summer 1995.
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| Description |
155-184
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| 11 |
ID:
060585
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| Publication |
Oct-Dec 2004.
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| 12 |
ID:
066673
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| 13 |
ID:
016125
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| Publication |
April-June 1993.
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| Description |
197-204
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| 14 |
ID:
061999
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| 15 |
ID:
008686
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| Publication |
July-Sept 1994.
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| Description |
337-349
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| 16 |
ID:
013288
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| Publication |
Winter 1997.
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| Description |
35-45
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| 17 |
ID:
177644
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although the US and Chinese security relationship has been
tense for over three decades, the last three years has seen it
slide into acute crisis. The two countries are in a full-blown
security dilemma, going after each other’s “core interests,”
using their alliances and partnerships to attempt to weaken
or restrain the other, and pushing aside confidence-building measures designed to help manage the competitive
relationship. Before deriving new policy measures that can
foster habits of cooperation between the two countries, the
United States and China must create a new strategic consensus around which the bilateral security relationship can be
defined
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| 18 |
ID:
141031
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| Publication |
DelhI, Gaurav Book Centre Pvt Ltd, 2015.
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| Description |
v, 328p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9789383316199
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058321 | 327.115405491/LAL 058321 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 19 |
ID:
012988
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| Publication |
1997.
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| Description |
49-55
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| 20 |
ID:
082400
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article undertakes a generic examination of the global change in understanding export controls with the end of the Cold War and in the wake of new threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation to and by non-state actors. These have necessitated a more inclusive approach to export controls. India, which until now has been outside such regimes, has a special significance since it is a major user, producer and trader of dual-use items and technologies. The article links the global changes with a simultaneous transformation in India's perception of export controls. It contrasts India's past and present approaches to export controls, identifies measures towards their better institutionalisation, highlights implementation challenges unique to the Indian environment and suggests measures to overcome these challenges. The article also argues that while export controls ensure trade with security, they have limited value as tools of non-proliferation, which in order to be sustainable, must not only dry up supply sources but also mitigate demand.
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