Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
112216
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Publication |
New Delhi, IDSA, 2012.
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Description |
144p.
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Standard Number |
9789382169048
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
056517 | 951.05/SIN 056517 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
056518 | 951.05/SIN 056518 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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2 |
ID:
121082
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
The intrusion by the Chinese Army in the Ladakh sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was first reported by the media on 15 April 2013. Initial reports indicated that about 30-40 armed soldiers of the Chinese Army had set up three to four tents in the area of Depsang Bulge, south east of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO). Subsequently, media reports indicated that the Government had accepted this intrusion to be 19 km from the LAC, inside Indian territory. The Depsang Bulge is east of the River Shyok and close to DBO, an old forward airfield, recently activated as part of the infrastructure development plan of the Indian armed forces in the Ladakh sector. The intrusion became significant because it was the first time that a transgressing patrol had set up camp and indicated its will to continue to stay put and proclaim, by way of banners, the area to be Chinese territory.
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3 |
ID:
084298
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4 |
ID:
179307
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Summary/Abstract |
Understanding the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has been a challenge for military thinkers and planners due to opacity and secrecy within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This article delves into the traditional relationship between the erstwhile Soviet (now Russian) and Chinese militaries and draw parallels between the two RMA. It argues that in many ways the Chinese RMA has followed the Russian RMA, which was driven by the latter’s experiences in modern wars in Georgia, Ukraine, Crimea, and Syria. The article concludes that the PLA has suitably modified the Russian military doctrines, reorganisation and restructuring as well as the induction of military equipment to suit the threats and challenges that confront it. Military thinkers and planners would do well to study the Russian RMA to extrapolate the future trajectory of the changes that are underway in the PLA.
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5 |
ID:
118495
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6 |
ID:
115898
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7 |
ID:
129979
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8 |
ID:
115949
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
The article looks at the implications of Hu Jintao's speech at the 18th Party Congress regarding the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) military modernization programme and analyses the significance of 2020 as a key timeline in the speech. Drawing from the previous biennial National Defense papers and significant statements of the Chinese leadership, it assesses the modernization plan of the PLA's four services in the Sino- Indian context and the probable capabilities that each service is likely will develop by 2020. The analysis covers the training, education, logistics and development of weapons and equipment by the PLA. This would enable Indian planners to assess the PLA capabilities and capacity as also temper own modernization plans to deter a possible China threat by 2020.
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