| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
084344
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2008.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
There is no doubt that General Petraeus’s strategies salvaged Iraq. His successes, however, mask a vital policy debate about the future of our armed services. American leaders must ignore the false choice between forces prepared for counterinsurgency or those trained for conventional warfare. Can we create a military ready for all types of future wars?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
118303
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article addresses why counterinsurgency is not, in fact, a strategy, and why the United States will nevertheless need to retain a counterinsurgency capability. It further examines the drivers of modern insurgency; the range of counterinsurgency approaches that have worked globally; and several case studies that illustrate how the United States might improve its counterinsurgency activity moving forward.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
176349
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Counting hulls and emphasizing advanced platforms obscures the real problems.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
105597
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
148074
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The effort to raise host nation security forces was central to the U.S. strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. poured massive resources into both countries. Unfortunately, U.S. planners failed to understand the cultural and political environments in which these forces would have to operate. Thus, the United States attempted to build ministries and forces based on U.S. models that simply were not appropriate for those nations. Although the training teams successfully recruited, trained, and deployed almost a million Afghans and Iraqis, Iraqi forces have collapsed and the Afghans are struggling to keep the insurgents at bay.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|