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| 1 |
ID:
132249
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Writing on British intelligence has tended to concentrate on the collection machinery in specific local contexts, the development of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the use of intelligence product by government. The emphasis has been on the optimisation of the intelligence bureaucracy in the face of Colonial Office intransigence. What this analysis largely leaves out, however, is a description of the culture and practices of the Colonial Office as it attempted to work with various colonial governments. Instead there is a tendency to overemphasise the rational nature of the bureaucratic changes in Whitehall and the contribution of MI5 and MI6 in the maintenance of security in the colonies. This article seeks to address these oversights by examining the divisions between the Colonial Office and the rest of the Whitehall intelligence machinery and show how counter-subversion remained a challenge to administrators both before and after the emergence of the Joint Intelligence Committee system.
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| 2 |
ID:
096259
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The return of a hung parliament at the 2010 general election is a serious possibility. But due to Westminster's limited recent experience of parliaments under 'no overall control' there is little institutional memory in Whitehall or Westminster, and even less public understanding, of what the implications would be. This article sets out to analyse the principal challenges that would be faced by government, opposition, parliament and the media in the event of a hung parliament. Drawing on experience from Canada, New Zealand and Scotland, we discuss the difficulties that may arise during the immediate government formation process and in the course of making minority or multiparty governance work on an ongoing basis. We conclude that a hung parliament need not undermine political stability or effective governance, but that all actors would need to adapt their behaviour and should therefore prepare carefully for this eventuality.
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| 3 |
ID:
084361
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| 4 |
ID:
111667
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the politics of the October 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), focussing on the points of difference between the main political parties (and within the Cameron coalition government) and the political dynamics of the review process. In examining how the government's core mission to reduce the country's 'historic deficit' impacted on the review process and outcomes, we are also able to highlight the practical results of a political philosophy that is currently being implemented across Whitehall. We argue that defence is a path-finding policy area for a new kind of post-industrial bureaucratic environment typified by a 'thin-client' and 'smart customer' function that interacts with industry.
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| 5 |
ID:
133235
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
'Mindless' empiricism rules in British central government, bolstered by the use of prerogative powers and the absence of any 'court of appeal' to insist on definitions and uniformities. This gives arguments about quangos-arm's-length bodies-a surreal quality. The Cameron coalition has created many new quangos, while claiming a cull. Unless and until Whitehall acquires, or is forced to acquire, better habits of mind, it may be a waste of time for academics and reformers to prepare taxonomies and call for more administrative rationality.
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| 6 |
ID:
105870
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Coalition government is an unfamiliar experience for Whitehall and Westminster. All actors are still adapting to the rules of this new political game. A number of governance challenges confront the United Kingdom's Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. It must strike a balance between the visions of two distinct parties and blend these into a coherent strategy for government. Like any government, it will expect to resolve most differences internally and then to show a united face to the world. Effective consultation and dispute-resolution processes within the executive will therefore be at a premium. But the separate political identities of the two parties also need to be preserved, and sufficient resources must be provided to each side within the government to enable this to happen. This article assesses the response of the coalition to these challenges in its first six months and draws lessons from relevant international experience.
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