|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
084648
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
095514
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
152140
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
There is demand among Russia's oligarchs for systemic change, but not for the rule of law proper. Instead, it is the defacto accountability of political elites and improved relations with the West that the Russian oligarchs want from the Kremlin. However, the oligarchs currently lack the capacity to effect change. Their insufficient leverage vis-à-vis Putin is rooted in their competition for rents, which prevents them from confronting the Kremlin as a united force. In addition to analyzing the lack of systemic pressure for change from the oligarchs, this essay considers the prospects of individual oligarchs who have nevertheless pushed openly for liberalization or tried to effect incremental change. It also draws on comparisons with other countries to chart the political behavior of Russia's business elites in the future.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
140814
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Nederland, Time-Life international, 1966.
|
| Description |
159p.: ill.hbk
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 000432 | 949.6/STI 000432 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
137318
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
BOSPORUS' TRAFFIC will be reduced to zero," Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey stated in April 2011 as he spoke to a thousands-strong Turkish audience, suggesting as an alternative to the current Bosporus a new "grandiose project," the Bosporus-2 (the official name being Kanal Istanbul).1 Raised in the run-up to the parliamentary elections, the question of the construction of the channel immediately after the victory of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) risked being forgotten. However, from statements of the Turkish government ahead of the presidential election in August this year it became clear that work on the project continues and practical steps are already underway for its implementation.2 With some skepticism, however, Erdogan's plan upset the Turkish and world community over the issue of the legal status of the new strait and unnecessary fuss around the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
090416
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article presents a post-colonial perspective on post-Soviet conflict in Georgia. Patterns of group classification and incorporation in the tsarist and Soviet eras are charted, to argue that Soviet Georgia was incorporated as a series of layered peripheries, differentiated not only by ethnic affiliation with titular groups, but also by the mode of incorporation into the wider political unit of which they formed part. This produced contrasting articulations of the link between language, identity and power among Georgians, Abkhazians and Ossetians, mediating conflicting reactions to the prospect of post-Soviet devolution. Finally, the nature of the post-Soviet sovereignty attained by Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia is considered.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
105035
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Every revolution is a surprise. Still, the latest Russian Revolution must be counted among the greatest of surprises. In the years leading up to 1991, virtually no Western expert, scholar, official, or politician foresaw the impending collapse of the Soviet Union, and with it one-party dictatorship, the state-owned economy, and the Kremlin's control over its domestic and Eastern European empires. Neither, with one exception, did Soviet dissidents nor, judging by their memoirs, future revolutionaries themselves. When Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party in March 1985, none of his contemporaries anticipated a revolutionary crisis. Although there were disagreements over the size and depth of the Soviet system's problems, no one thought them to be life-threatening, at least not anytime soon.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
192138
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Russia’s war in Ukraine is changing Russia itself. It is subordinating stability and prosperity to geopolitical obsession, and is mobilising society around active support for costly, indefinite aggression. This is breaking stabilising bargains the regime has struck at home with elites and the wider population. The system is not yet close to crisis, but the strains it faces will deepen.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
125209
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Although the US-Russian relationship continues to deteriorate in the face of a vengeful Kremlin ban on American adoptions of Russian orphans, Vladimir Putin is still pursuing a strategy of influencing-and infiltrating-European political establishments. Given the amount of capital that Russia and her billionaire oligarchs have invested in the continent, this policy is as much defensive as it is self-interested. The European Commission's deadly-serious investigation into Gazprom's monopolistic practices, the beginning of the end of German Ostpolitik, and the ongoing dispute with Russia over the Syria crisis hint at an imminent confrontation between Moscow and EU countries. And while state-owned media outlets turn out anti-American propaganda to match equivalent policy measures, for the time being, Russia is still very much committed to swaying European opinion by using both transparent economic appeals (especially in the energy sector, the Gazprom case notwithstanding) and also the kind of Le Carré-esque skulduggery that was supposed to have vanished with the Cold War.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
084646
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
182255
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Donald Trump wanted his July
2018 meeting in Helsinki with
his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, to evoke memories ofthe
momentous encounters that took place in
the 1980s between U.S. President Ronald
Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev. Those arms control summits
had yielded the kind oficonic imagery
that Trump loved: strong, serious men
meeting in distant places to hash out the
great issues ofthe day.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
115059
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
There, but for an accident of geography, stands a corpse!" thundered Max Shachtman-once known as Leon Trotsky's "foreign minister"-in New York City in 1950. By popular account, the line had been cooked up that night by a young Shachtmanite named Irving Howe; it ended the debate between the anti-Stalinist socialist Schachtman and his opponent, Earl Browder, former head of the Communist Party USA, who had been expelled from the party in 1946 at the behest of Moscow Central after suggesting that Soviet Communism and American capitalism might coexist after all.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 13 |
ID:
100602
|
|
|
| 14 |
ID:
115608
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Even as the Obama administration has pivoted toward the Asia-Pacific region, so has the Kremlin. .
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 15 |
ID:
084639
|
|
|
| 16 |
ID:
084645
|
|
|
| 17 |
ID:
084647
|
|
|
| 18 |
ID:
093722
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses the emergence of United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya) as a dominant party by examining the behaviour of Russia's governors. Using original data on when governors joined United Russia, the article demonstrates that those governors with access to autonomous political resources were more reluctant to join the dominant party. By showing that Russian elite members made their affiliation decisions on the basis of calculations about their own political resources rather than simply being coerced by the Kremlin, this article provides evidence for a theory of dominant party formation that casts the problem as a two-sided commitment problem between leaders and elites.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 19 |
ID:
143507
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
London, Editions Bernard Grasset, 1969.
|
| Description |
570p.hbk
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 002278 | 947.0854/TAT 002278 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 20 |
ID:
151705
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive approach employed by Russia to reassert influence in Europe. The changing face of Russia’s strategy commenced in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia. This was followed by a large Russian conventional attack against Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas of the nation. 2014 witnessed the Russian annexation of Crimea where in just a week, Russia seized control of Crimea “without firing a shot.” The annexation of Crimea was rapidly followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in eastern Ukraine. The common thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and confuse decision makers in the West.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|