Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
084648
|
|
|
2 |
ID:
084649
|
|
|
3 |
ID:
150115
|
|
|
Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that NATO is unable to challenge any of President Putin's expansive policies for two key reasons: First, Europe and the United States have conflicting views on what events qualify as key security threats (different threat perceptions). Infused within this paradigm is a nascent European Union strategic culture that views threats differently from the U.S. This in turn undermines NATO, as the Europeans argue for largely nonmilitary or more peacekeeping-oriented approaches to respond to threats that are quintessentially multilateral. Second, even though there are major differences between the NATO states and Russia, the two most pressing issues before the Atlantic Alliance are Iran and Syria. The NATO states know that a resolution to the Syrian civil war or to Iran's nuclear program is unlikely without the support of Moscow, which limits their ability to effectively challenge Russia. This article concludes with a call for NATO to focus on identifying a new agenda for the Atlantic Alliance, one that is more human-security oriented, as it addresses the root causes of instability in and around the Eurozone.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4 |
ID:
152137
|
|
|
Summary/Abstract |
In Putin's Russia, the regime uses the law and legal institutions to fulfill political goals, to communicate them to society, and to manage the authoritarian coalition that helps the president govern. As a result, the law is highly consequential and important, but its use tends to be arbitrary, expedient, and instrumental, rather than predictable and principled. Can we expect any major shifts in the role of law and the courts over the next ten years? Russia's legal regime is unlikely to undergo major evolutionary change and may outlive Putin's tenure: both foreign and domestic pressures for change toward constitutionalism are limited. If a positive shift were to take place, Russia would inch toward authoritarian constitutionalism. But negative change is also possible. If Putin's regime weakens, the politicized use of the courts against both dissidents and political competitors within the authoritarian coalition will increase.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|