| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
132706
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Instead of chauvinism and chaos Russia needs a third alternative. And that is a combination of moderate patriotism and moderate liberalism manifesting itself in the commitment to freer life by law, without corruption, but with mature self-government.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
132710
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Russia will have to deal with the effects of Crimea being part of an independent Ukraine for 23 years. A Crimean political and business elite has emerged with its own values, bonds, and relationships. Russia is not the motherland of an entire generation of Russian-speaking youth, but the motherland of their ancestors.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
132705
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The new post-Crimean risk for Russia's political system is not so much in putting political participation on freeze as in forcing this participation, which might push the country onto the road to ideology-driven authoritarianism.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
132709
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Armenia, opting for self-restraint of its own accord, minimized its risks and losses. As to whether the Armenian-style Finlandization can be an example for other former Soviet republics would depend not only on their own choice.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
132824
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
As separatist militias mount an active insurgency in eastern Ukraine, the crisis is set to continue. Anna Arutunyan and Mark Galeotti examines Russia's role, emerging groups, and government attempts to contain the violence and regain control
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
132712
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The participation of Donetsk representatives in the government corresponds to the "horizontal principle," but domination does not. There will be neither real reform nor a modern and efficient state in Ukraine unless regions feel that they are equal.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
084654
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
132782
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The crisis in Ukraine probably has ruined prospects for another formal Russian-U.S. arms control agreement during the Obama administration's second term. Even before the crisis over Crimea, Russian and U.S. negotiators differed sharply on their preferred outcomes for reducing their strategic nuclear forces further, eliminating or consolidating nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe, constraining national and theater strategic defenses, or renewing conventional arms limitations in Europe.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
134093
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Obama administration seems to believe that Vladimir Putin should not be taken too seriously. The annexation of Crimea and belligerence over Ukraine are, to quote the president and his secretary of state, a sign of "weakness," the hallmark of a "regional" power stuck in "the old ways of doing things," leading no bloc of nations and having "no global ideology." These assumptions may be comforting rationales for a lack of response to the Kremlin's recent moves, but they misread the game Putin is playing-and underestimate its significance.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|