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| 1 |
ID:
114245
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
International security concerns about ballistic missile proliferation have frequently highlighted the links between ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. This article examines the extent of these links through a comprehensive survey of ballistic missile and space rocket programs in regional powers. It notes that missiles were derived from existing space launchers in just a small fraction of these cases. In a slightly greater fraction, space launchers were drawn from existing missile programs. This analysis suggests that though security concerns about space launchers being used as ballistic missiles are valid, the reverse trend, that of ballistic missiles being used as space launch vehicles, cannot be ignored. At the same time, as long as regional powers are limited to short-range and medium-range systems, their missile and space projects would only raise limited missile proliferation and space security concerns.
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| 2 |
ID:
130002
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since China tested a Kinetic-Energy Anti-Satellite (KE-ASAT) weapon in 2007, evidence has surfaced that India may have initiated a similar program. This article makes an anticipatory policy intervention against the development of KE-ASAT weapons. It presents data to show that space debris, and not KE-ASAT weapons, pose the highest risk for the safe operation of Indian satellites. It models a KE-ASAT weapons exchange between India and China in three different scenarios to demonstrate that use of such weapons even on a limited scale would produce an exponential increase in space debris. The latter would threaten the safe operation of satellites for all countries concerned. These data suggest that the concept of deterrence as understood in conventional and nuclear spheres is not easily transportable to the domain of space weapons, which threaten the physical destruction of satellites. If weaponization of space becomes inevitable, policy makers would be better off investing in weapons that disable but do not physically destroy satellites.
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| 3 |
ID:
084877
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| 4 |
ID:
100221
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
India has recently stated an intention to develop an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. The reasons for this may include the country's growing economic and political clout, alongside the increasing importance of space to this status, the significance of space assets to the military, a perceived threat from China, and fear of being disadvantaged in future treaty negotiations if not 'in the club'. Nevertheless, development and use of an ASAT would have potentially catastrophic debris-related consequences that would also create major political problems for the user. The state of India's ASAT activities is described and recommendations on avoiding hasty development, such as researching methods of protecting satellites, strengthening bilateral relations with China and pushing for a legally binding norm on ASATs, are made.
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