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| 1 |
ID:
085846
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
ASEAN, whose internaional prestige grew as a result of its diplomatic role in 1970s, can be seen as providing a model for linking the very disparate states of the Asia-Pacific region in a common association.
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| 2 |
ID:
084885
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Australia-India relationship has reached its strongest point for many years, but it is poised at the edge of a difficult issue that may undermine all the hard work. Economic relations are very robust, with Australia's energy supplier role being increasingly important to India. Mutual strategic interests in Asia, the Indian Ocean and counter-terrorism dictate greater focus on the underdeveloped security relationship. But it is the tricky matter of uranium sales that is the big issue in bilateral relations. It has the potential to create a major rupture if a mature accommodation is not reached. Australia and India could develop a stronger and broader partnership that will benefit both but the uranium issue will be a significant challenge to overcome on the way.
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| 3 |
ID:
132043
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Problems Facing Regional Cooperation in East Asia great efforts are being made in East Asia to improve regional and Gsub-regional multilateral cooperation in the face of a bottleneck. The key issues are listed below:
First, there is a mismatch between size and effectiveness. Generally speaking, the larger the cooperation organization the more con?icts that arise and thus the less effective they are. Because of efforts by countries such as the U.S.,2 Australia, Japan, and India to further their strategic or diplomatic interests, these organizations are growing in regional coverage, which causes issues to become diversified and in turn causes the organizations to lose sight of their mission. Subsequently, many regional or trans-regional multilateral organizations such as APEC, the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Security Forum are increasingly playing aless effective role. For example, APEC summits and the EAS usually just
end up with a symbolic proclamation without any substance or ' Han Caizhen is Professor at the School of lntemational Studies, Renmin University of China. Shi Yinhong is Counselor at the Counselors' Office at the State Council and Professor at the School of lntemational Studies, Renmin University ot'China
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| 4 |
ID:
132020
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2014.
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In this paper, I argue that the "Middle East" is an ideational construct maintained by geographical, intellectual, and ideological representations. I assert that the geographical boundaries of the area called the Middle East have shifted over the past century to reflect the strategic interests of the major hegemonic power in the region, initially Britain and later the United States. Drawing on published and archival sources, I trace the etymology of the "Middle East" and its accompanying geographical representations and their relationship to key American and British foreign policy decisions and declarations. I also discuss how the Arabic translation of the "Middle East," or al-Sharq al-Awsa?, has been adopted and contested by scholars and journalists in the region.
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| 5 |
ID:
128273
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Though the PLA elite perceptions of the United States have fluctuated over time, there has been some regularity in the evolution of their perceptions. Comparing the dominant perceptions of the United States among different generations of Chinese military elites in the PRC, we find that the PLA elite perceptions of US intentions have been foremost influenced by China's strategic interest in a certain period, rather than the level and intensity of bilateral exchanges at the time. Using the case of US arms sales to Taiwan and the case of the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands, we try to assess how consistent and persistent PLA elite perceptions of the US have been in recent years. While we agree that these outspoken military men cannot be taken on the surface as indicative of China's national policies, we will also point out several important dimensions that are likely to allow the PLA to play a more influential role in setting the agenda for China's strategic interest in the era of Xi Jinping.
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| 6 |
ID:
146526
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China’s declared foreign policy of ‘non-interference’ is contradicted by its actions in recent times. Beyond activities in the East and South China Seas, the involvement of China in negotiations on the Korean Peninsula, the evacuation of Chinese citizens from various crises, and the deployment of Chinese combat troops to peacekeeping missions in Africa have indicated China’s growing interests in the shape of world affairs, coinciding with a growing economic and military capacity to influence them. Much attention has been given to the potential consequences of great-power competition between the USA and China, but little focus has been given to the impact these trends may have in the outlying regions of Chinese foreign policy. One such place is Melanesia in the South Pacific—a subregion where a small influence from a Chinese perspective can have a significant impact on Pacific Island Countries. This article postulates that, over time, there is potential for the consequences of Chinese interests to lead to accidental friction, and suggests that this risk can be mitigated through increased cooperation.
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| 7 |
ID:
150276
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| 8 |
ID:
137462
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At a time when the battlefield has been progressively transforming from the conventional to unconventional, the role of Special Forces will become critical in shaping its outcome. Conflicts in the past decade have established the primacy of such forces. Their role has evolved and today special operations are meant to be decisive and achieve strategic objectives. The Indian security establishment has also been taking notice of these changes and by and large making right moves. As India embarks on the path of high economic growth and becomes a power to reckon with, its troubled neighborhood poses the biggest challenge to it. The role of Special Forces will thus be critical in outwitting adversaries’ moves in the neighborhood and areas of India’s strategic interests, and in promoting India’s security.
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| 9 |
ID:
151905
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| Publication |
Abingdon, RUSI, 2017.
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| Description |
xii, 106p.pbk
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| Standard Number |
9781138079618
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058973 | 355.031091821/OLS 058973 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
130724
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
India has significantly invested in Nepal's development through economic assistance since 1952. Despite deploying aid to win the hearts and minds of the people of Nepal, India has not entirely succeeded in doing so. Paradoxically, an analysis of Indian aid and gaps in the planning, processes, modalities and perceptions of India's motivation shows that it has possibly contributed to the fuelling of anti-India sentiments among the Nepalese population. Although Indian aid has not been refused, it has been resisted, and sceptical nationalist sentiments dominate perceptions of Indian aid in Nepal. Why is India not perceived as a major donor despite providing significant aid? Why do vested political and economic interests mar the public perception of Indian aid to Nepal? This article is an attempt to reconstruct the history of India's developmental aid to Nepal, outline the trends, shifting priorities and modalities as well offering a critical analysis of the perceptions of Indian aid. The article is limited to development aid and excludes military aid and investments.
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| 11 |
ID:
127416
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| 12 |
ID:
104701
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| 13 |
ID:
086404
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the emerging strategic scenario in the world and Asia in paricular, the Indo-US nuclear deal and India' strategic partnership with the USA had its resonance on Sino-Japanese relations as well, particularly on China. What had added grist to the quadrilateral relations among the USA, Japan, China and India is the signing of the India-Japan Security declaration during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singhto Japan in October 2008.
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| 14 |
ID:
132872
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The strategic culture of the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) is based on three pillars: attaining prosperity and strength as an enduring national purpose and objective; countering the existential North Korean threat; and maintaining a strong alliance with the United States. This strategic culture is grounded in history, especially in Koreans' sense of themselves as an ancient and homogeneous people, the minjok, and in a constructed martial heritage. Keepers of strategic culture include the national security establishment, the National Assembly, the media, the public, and the United States, but the most important keeper is the president, who ultimately defines South Korea's strategic interests and how they should be attained or guarded. Contemporary illustrations of South Korean strategic culture in action include defence reform measures, shifts in the American alliance, and the 'crisis of 2013', which included a North Korean nuclear test and extreme threats of war. This article reinforces the view that while strategic culture may be a universal concept, in its operationalized and practised form, the true value of the concept is that the unique and particularistic characteristics that define each specific strategic cultural tradition are placed at the centre of analysis. South Korea's strategic culture is unique, but if there is an aspect that can be applied to other nations it is that shared historical memory and public historiography are crucial factors that inform that nation's strategic culture
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