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| 1 |
ID:
150433
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| 2 |
ID:
156373
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| 3 |
ID:
084911
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| 4 |
ID:
090181
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The scheming had gone on for hours. The Iraquis were from a half dozen different political groupings, some secrarian, some secular. It was Baghdad, it was February 2009 and it was less than a month after Iraq's provincial elections.For our hosts, the purpose of the dinner was to assure me and a colleague that their coalition had enough people on its side to oust Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki in a vote of no confidence. It was one of many such meals we attended on that trip with Iraqi friends determined to prevent Maliki from spinning his recent electoral victories into absolute power.
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| 5 |
ID:
118472
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| 6 |
ID:
116771
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2012.
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In the U.S. 179th Infantry Regiment's official history, Warren P. Munsell, Jr., describes a major battle on 2 June 1944, when companies F and G of the second battalion captured and secured the heavily defended Hill K-9 south of Rome. However, on 9 June 1944, a second lieutenant in the first battalion's B Company wrote that his company captured and secured Hill K-9. Using military records and eyewitness accounts, I attempt to determine which unit actually took, secured, and held Hill K-9-an essentially forgotten battle that nevertheless played a major role in Rome's fall two days later.
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| 7 |
ID:
150337
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“The fundamental dilemma in Ukraine’s decommunization process is how to undo the legal, institutional, and historical legacy of the Soviet era without repeating the Soviet approach of mandating one ‘correct’ interpretation of the past…”
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| 8 |
ID:
148389
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Almost all history books claim that the Battle of Lake Khasan was provoked in the summer of 1938 by the aggression of Imperial Japan into Soviet territory. The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal of 1946 accepted this version propagated by Moscow, which almost all historians have also accepted. There has been no substantive re-examination of this battle for more than three quarters of a century. Recent publications from Soviet military archives as well as documents from the Dmitrii Volkogonov Archive suggest that the Soviet-Japanese military conflict of 1938 was a cleverly disguised Soviet provocation. This fundamental reassessment of the battle has far-reaching implications for Moscow’s war of camouflage, disinformation, and obfuscation during the Soviet and post-Soviet era.
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| 9 |
ID:
148417
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| 10 |
ID:
102875
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| 11 |
ID:
141408
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After most Central European states joined the EU and NATO, it seemed that the last page of Cold War history had been turned. But reports of the death of conflict in the region turned out to have been greatly exaggerated. Russia is on the move again, aiming to show the world that NATO has feet of clay, that the EU is a geopolitical weak sister and the transatlantic alliance a myth. The US might be slowly waking up to the challenge of Vladimir Putin’s evermore expansionist Russia, but it still considers the issue a “regional” problem. The Kremlin’s objective is not to send tanks into Tallinn, however, but to compromise the White House.
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| 12 |
ID:
092912
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This short article returns to the issue of the value of British Lend-Lease tanks for the Soviet war effort during late 1941 from a research note in Volume 19, Number 2 of this journal.
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| 13 |
ID:
106176
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| 14 |
ID:
125968
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
After Issus (333 BC), Alexander took possession of Syria and the Levant coast. The next year he attacked Tyre, a rich and strategic Phoenician port and its largest city-state. Tyre was the only Persian port that had not capitulated. Even this far into the war, the Persian navy still posed a threat. Tyre was located both on the Mediterranean coast and an island with two natural harbours. Alexander built a causeway to allow his army to take the town by land. This engineering feat showed the true extent of his brilliance: he built a kilometer-long causeway on a natural land bridge no more than two metres deep. He then constructed two towers 150-feet high at the end of the causeway. The Tyrians, however, quickly counterattacked. They filled an old transport ship with wood, pitch, sulphur and other combustibles, lit it on fire creating a primitive form of napalm, and ran it up onto the causeway, which was engulfed by the flames.
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| 15 |
ID:
131042
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2014.
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If the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) were to be believed, the paramilitary forces fighting the internal security battle - especially in the Red Corridor - were provided with the best equipment. The paramilitary personnel, however, think otherwise. Either it is inadequate number of weapons and systems, or inefficient training; till now the paramilitary forces have not been able to handle the security situation in the Naxal stronghold areas. Latest in the long list of disappointments were the incidents of Naxal attacks during the General Elections.
On April 12, Bastar and Bijapur districts in Chhattisgarh witnessed Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) blasts during the voting season. Maoists triggered landmines in these two areas which claimed the lives of seven polling officials and five Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel. Three days later, another blast was carried out which killed three security forces. On May 11, seven cops were killed in yet another landmine blast in Gadchiroli district in Maharashtra.
When asked for MHA's assessment on these security lapses, a highly placed official in the ministry said that the paramilitary personnel were in the 'election mode', and as a result security vacuum was created. He implied that it was not physically possible to ensure full safety in this so-called 'election mode'. He then tossed over the responsibility and blame on to the director generals (DG) of the paramilitary forces. "The top leadership of the paramilitary forces could have done better by ensuring proper training to their troops," he said. Giving the example of mini-training centres, which were the brain-child of the then DG CRPF Vijay Kumar, the MHA official said that the DGs did not take this idea forward. Apparently, lack of coordinated efforts between the top officials led to the lack of training.
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| 16 |
ID:
097638
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| 17 |
ID:
095688
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| 18 |
ID:
097396
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Penguin Viking, 2010.
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| Description |
x, 398p.
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| Standard Number |
9780670083275, hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 055028 | 327.54051/JHA 055028 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 19 |
ID:
178686
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| Summary/Abstract |
Extant scholarship on interstate war and conflict resolution predominantly utilizes formal models, case studies, and statistical models with wars as the unit of analysis to assess the impact of battlefield activity on war duration and termination. As such, longstanding views of war have not been tested systematically using intraconflict measures, and deeper studies of war dynamics have also been hampered. I address these gaps by creating and introducing the Interstate War Battle (IWB) dataset, which captures the outcomes and dates of 1,708 battles across 97 interstate wars since 1823. This article describes the sources used to create these data, provides definitions, and presents descriptive statistics for the basic battle data and several daily-level measures constructed from them. I then use the data to test the implications of two major theoretical perspectives on conflict termination: the informational view, which emphasizes convergence in beliefs through battlefield activity; and Zartman’s ripeness theory, which highlights costly stalemates in fighting. I find suggestive evidence for informational views and little support for ripeness theory: new battlefield outcomes promote negotiated settlements, while battlefield stagnation undermines them. The IWB dataset has significant implications, highlights future research topics, and motivates a renewed research agenda on the empirical study of conflict.
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| 20 |
ID:
153154
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