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| 1 |
ID:
099549
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| 2 |
ID:
091491
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The following article aims to examine current counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan to posit an untried theoretical concept of operations for the war being waged there. By doing so it shall argue that Coalition and NATO forces operating there may be required to fundamentally recast Afghan war-policy if a resurgent Taliban and Al-Qa'eda are to be countered in both the military and political spheres of present day Afghanistan. By way of strategy this article shall posit that a more optimal strategy in Afghanistan, in light of the campaign's apparent difficulties, might be to seed local security apparatuses, designated herein as 'Rural Paramilitary Forces'.
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| 3 |
ID:
123039
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
You have a row of dominos set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.
Dwight D. Eisenhower
For too long, we have lived with the "Vietnam Syndrome." Much of that syndrome has been created by the North Vietnamese aggressors who now threaten the peaceful people of Thailand. Over and over they told us for nearly 10 years that we were the aggressors bent on imperialistic conquests. They had a plan. It was to win in the field of propaganda here in America what they could not win on the field of battle in Vietnam. As the years dragged on, we were told that peace would come if we would simply stop interfering and go home. It is time we recognized that ours was, in truth, a noble cause. A small country newly free from colonial rule sought our help in establishing self-rule and the means of self-defense against a totalitarian neighbor bent on conquest. We dishonor the memory of 50,000 young Americans who died in that cause when we give way to feelings of guilt as if we were doing something shameful, and we have been shabby in our treatment of those who returned. They fought as well and as bravely as any Americans have ever fought in any war. They deserve our gratitude, our respect, and our continuing concern. There is a lesson for all of us in Vietnam. If we are forced to fight, we must have the means and the determination to prevail or we will not have what it takes to secure the peace. And while we are at it, let us tell those who fought in that war that we will never again ask young men to fight and possibly die in a war our government is afraid to let them win.
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| 4 |
ID:
084997
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article will apply what shall be termed a "strategic hub" concept of counterinsurgency to the war in Iraq. This concept posits that the development of insurgent and militia nodes or "hubs" of activity could provide a more relevant way to address the key dilemmas of the Iraq equation in light of the Coalition and Iraq government's inability to secure Iraq. The article will argue that ceding the insurgency and militias ground on a temporary basis may be required to maintain both military and political momentum in the post "surge" Iraq given the draw down of U.S. forces, the immaturity of the Iraqi Security Forces, and the present state of American and Iraqi politics.
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| 5 |
ID:
122768
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Though it is nigh on 12 years since 9/11, there is still no agreed definition of terrorism. Indeed, the original nations of the "Coalition of the Willing," who previously pursued a "War on Terror" so vigorously (Australia, Britain and the USA) have come full circle now to disown entirely the very notion of a "War on Terror." A key stumbling point towards a definition remains whether terrorism should be classified as an act of crime or of war. The two conceptualisations are philosophically and fundamentally opposed and inevitably from each flows entirely different strategic prescriptions to counter the phenomenon. If policy is to be guided adequately, let alone optimally, the philosophical arguments of each camp must be thrown headlong into one another, with the last philosophy standing the victor and then claiming the policy spoils.
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| 6 |
ID:
108604
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