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ID: 091807

Blame game / Wahab, Abdul

Wahab, Abdul	Journal Article
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Publication	2009.
Summary/Abstract	The emergence of Jundullah and its activities in Iranian Balochistan has triggered a hostile reponse from Iran's leadership towards the Pakistan government for supporting and assisting the militant organisation.

Key Words

Iran ; Border Security ; Suicide Attack ; Blame Game ; Islamic Revolutionary Guards ; Iranian Media ;
Abdolhamid Rigi ; Pakistan - 1967-1977

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ID: 154595

Blame game / Adil, Adnan

Adil, Adnan	Journal Article
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Blame Game ; Nawaz Sharif

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ID: 099481

Indo-Pak relations / Suhrawardy, Nilofar

Suhrawardy, Nilofar	Journal Article
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Publication

2010.

Key Words

India ; LOC ; Nuclear Diplomacy ; India - Relations - Pakistan ; Pakistan - Relations - India ; Blame Game ;
Pakistan - 1967-1977

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ID: 085070

Under a cloud: Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, former Pakistani nuclear scientist / Mills, Elizabeth

Mills, Elizabeth	Journal Article
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Publication

2008.

Key Words

Army ; Bomb ; Abdul Qadeer Khan ; Nuclear Scientist ; Blame Game ; Pakistan - 1967-1977

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ID: 177952

When transparency meets accountability: how the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic became a blame game in Wuhan / Ran, Ran; Jian, Yan

Jian, Yan	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

Existing studies of Chinese officials’ blame avoidance behavior argue that Chinese officials’ motivation for blame avoidance comes from top-down performance evaluation and responsibility attribution pressures and Chinese officials tend to deflect the blame downward to lower levels. Nevertheless, at the early stage of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, local officials made the unusual move of deflecting blame upward onto the central level and both central and local actors became embroiled in a blame game that took place against the backdrop of recent recentralization drive. To better explain this puzzle, this article examines how bottom-up public demands for transparency as well as top-down responsibility attribution pressures together shape the motivations, strategies, and interactions of central and local officials in this blame game. Our research shows that the public appeals for transparency stoked the top-down responsibility attribution pressure, further reinforcing local officials as well as the center’s motivation to avoid blame at the early stage of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan. Local officials and central public health technocrats engaged in a blame game that played out in various media outlets. To insulate itself from public criticism and prevent the blame game from getting out of hand, the center ultimately responded by moving to hold local officials accountable through its propaganda and cadre disciplining apparatus.

Key Words

Accountability ; Transparency ; Blame Game ; Wuhan ; COVID-19

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