|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
100957
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Cold Start doctrine is an innovative exercise. While Cold Start discusses how to start the campaign, equal thinking needs to attend how to end it. On the conventional level, the learning is that the Cold Start offensives of the integrated battle groups need to be delinked from those of the strike corps. Plausible political aims cannot be visualised that make nuclear risk of launch of strike corps offensives worth running. On the nuclear front, fallout of the scenario considered is on the doctrine of 'massive' nuclear retaliation. This has its limitations in reacting to nuclear strikes of low opprobrium quotient. Moving to 'flexible' nuclear retaliation countenancing ending an exchange at the lowest possible level may be preferable instead. In the nuclear age, utility of military force has reached its limits. The future lies in energising non-military problem solving approaches.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
161281
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Mumbai, Strategic Foresight Group, 2018.
|
| Description |
iii, 92p.pbk
|
| Standard Number |
9788188262335
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059515 | 363.325/MOT 059515 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
153016
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates the role of the media as a vehicle for societal debates on issues not amenable to conventional political mediations. By referring to the nuclear power plant in Kudankulam, Tamil Nadu, the article shows that although the security of the plant was a grave concern, and despite media attempts to substantively facilitate public participation in the discussions about the plant, the media failed to function as an alternative forum for debate. The article ascribes this limitation to the sub-textual mechanism at work in journalistic practices. The analysis leads to a reassessment of the information that the media presents for articulating potential tactics of protest.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
134579
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
California, Hoover Institution Press, 2014.
|
| Description |
viii, 63p.Pbk
|
| Standard Number |
9780817918057
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057944 | 355.825119/SHU 057944 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
172895
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Since the end of the Cold War, changes to the practice of nuclear deterrence by the United States have been pursued as part of a comprehensive approach aimed at reducing nuclear risks. These changes have included steps to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. defense and deterrence strategies. Looking to the future, the United States can do more, but only if the conditions are right. Policy-makers must avoid steps that have superficial appeal but would actually result in a net increase in nuclear risk. These include steps that make U.S. nuclear deterrence unreliable for the problems for which it remains relevant.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
142397
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
179368
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Three decades after what is widely referred to as the transition from a First to a Second Nuclear Age, the world stands on the cusp of a possible Third Nuclear Age where the way that we conceptualise the central dynamics of the nuclear game will change again. This paradigm shift is being driven by the growth and spread of non-nuclear technologies with strategic applications and by a shift in thinking about the sources of nuclear threats and how they should be addressed, primarily, but not solely, in the United States. Recent scholarship has rightly identified a new set of challenges posed by the development of strategic non-nuclear weaponry (SNNW). But the full implications of this transformation in policy, technology and thinking for the global nuclear order as a whole have so far been underexplored. To remedy this, we look further ahead to the ways in which current trends, if taken to their logical conclusion, have the capacity to usher in a new nuclear era. We argue that in the years ahead, SNNW will increasingly shape the nuclear order, particularly in relation to questions of stability and risk. In the Third Nuclear Age, nuclear deployments, postures, balances, arms control, non-proliferation policy, and the prospects for disarmament, will all be shaped as much by developments in SNNW capabilities as by nuclear weapons. Consequently, we advocate for an urgent reassessment of the way nuclear order and nuclear risks are conceptualised as we confront the challenges of a Third Nuclear Age.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
010236
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
April 1996.
|
| Description |
44-49
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
154207
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|