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HENRIKSEN, DAG (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   111152


Deterrence by default? Israel's military strategy in the 2006 w / Henriksen, Dag   Journal Article
Henriksen, Dag Journal Article
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Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract This article explores the question: What was Israel's military strategy when it went to war against Hizballah and Lebanon in 2006? It argues that Israel's decision to go to war was not based on a thorough in-depth analysis of the specific situation at hand, but rather rooted in its strategic outlook cultivated in the decades preceding the war. This thinking has largely focused on the concept of deterrence, and should deterrence fail, to restore deterrence and ensure that the opponent would refrain from similar actions in the future. The need to have a clear political component - which the military effort should support - appears to have been significantly less in focus. Thus an almost pre-destined recipe of responding militarily 'dramatically beyond the expectations of the enemy' was put in action from the outset. The perception that a more specifically tailored military strategy was not needed was a miscalculation.
Key Words Israel  Military Strategy  Second Lebanon War 
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2
ID:   085097


Inflexible response: diplomacy, airpower and the kosovo crisis, 1998-1999 / Henriksen, Dag   Journal Article
Henriksen, Dag Journal Article
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Publication 2008.
Summary/Abstract This article examines the key lessons of combining diplomacy and airpower in the Kosovo Crisis (1998-99). Drawing on a comprehensive list of primary sources involved in the military leadership of NATO at the time, this article goes beyond existing literature in revealing just how surprisingly unprepared NATO was when it went to war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). This article argues that on the eve of war, NATO neither had a political nor a military strategy for handling the war it itself had started - and that at the time, the air power community in general failed to appreciate the need for producing more precise and innovative solutions to complex conflicts and crises in the lower band of the intensity spectrum.
Key Words NATO  KOSOVO  Airpower 
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