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| 1 |
ID:
085240
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article describes the cooperation between the Second Department Polish Army (intelligence) and American military attach s.
There have not been any separate monographs regarding the cooperation between the Second Department of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces and other secret services in the 1930s yet. Although this subject is quite essential, it is treated as a part of a more extensive issue, namely the operational activity of the Polish military secret service in the years 1918-1939.
The documents included in this article are the part of the correspondence between the American Attach s and the Second Department and deal mainly with organization, weaponry and dislocation of the units of the Red Army. Many of these documents contained the requests to the subsequent chiefs of the II Department of the GS of the PAF made by American diplomats. They asked to provide them with information about the Ordre de Bataille (the Battle Plan) of the Red Army and new types of weaponry and equipment of the Soviet armed forces.
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| 2 |
ID:
179764
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| Summary/Abstract |
The eventual decision by the Soviet military to dedicate a force to ‘special propaganda’ (or spetsprop) was sparked by disappointments in the pre-war campaigns, from the Far East to Finland between 1938 and 1940. Special propaganda represented one of the earliest forms of Soviet asymmetric warfare, one that would even outlive the Soviet state.
Stalin’s mass purge of the Soviet military, however, deprived special propaganda of the kind of officers it needed most: linguists and foreign area experts. The Soviet experience evidences the probable paradox that affects many totalitarian regimes’ efforts to influence audiences beyond their control: although propaganda is a critical element of their survival, their inherent insularity precludes the ability to understand the populations they seek to influence.
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| 3 |
ID:
099442
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the experience of the Soviet army's occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. It draws heavily on the report of the Russian General Staff, which gives a unique insight into the Soviet-Afghan war by senior Russian officers, many of whom served in Afghanistan. The author then places this analysis in the broader geopolitical context of Soviet expansionism from the early 1970s to the mid 1980s. And the author proceeds to ask: Did Afghanistan account for the demise of the USSR? Finally, the issue of whether there are parallels with the failure of the Soviet Union's invasion and the current problems facing the USA in Afghanistan is examined.
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| 4 |
ID:
093041
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| 5 |
ID:
184842
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| 6 |
ID:
133759
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Soviet invasion of Poland of 17 September 1939 may not have met widespread Polish resistance, but a number of significant engagements saw the Red Army take far from insignificant losses in a rushed operation characterized by overconfidence, poor planning, and cooperation between arms and inadequate logistical support. Materials published in Russian and English since the collapse of the Soviet Union and Soviet academic hegemony over Eastern Europe now allow us to examine the Soviet conduct of the invasion in much more detail than had previously been the case. Much of the material presented here on the topic is to be included in a chapter of a monograph concerned with Soviet military effectiveness during the period of the Second World War, and comments are welcome.
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