| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that the L'vov Offensive carried out by the 1st Ukrainian Front and a significant element of the 1st Belorussian Front in July 1944 should be regarded as the key offensive carried out by the Red Army between June and August 1944. This becomes particularly apparent if Soviet Deep Operations Theory is applied to this period and is further reinforced by an examination of how military assets were assigned in advance of the summer operations undertaken by the Red Army. This reinterpretation would suggest that the 'Deep Battle' conundrum concerning the successful delivery of key operational shocks in the summer of 1944 was how to facilitate the movement of German mobile forces away from the areas where these shocks would subsequently be delivered. Thus, while the Belorussian Operation delivered a decisive operational shock to Army Group Centre it also became the means by which German mobile formations were drawn away from the very area where the Red Army intended to deliver its key operational shock in what became known as the L'vov-Sandomierz Operation (originally designated as the L'vov-Peremyshl' Operation).1 The political and strategic advantages subsequently gained by the success of the L'vov-Sandomierz Operation, combined with the application of deep operations theory and the deployment of key military assets prior to this operation, suggest that this success was neither accidental nor opportunistic but part of a process of deliberate planning.
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