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| 1 |
ID:
085400
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Shortly after the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC, 1958), European countries accepted a far-reaching liberalization of their previously fairly protectionist external trade relations. I provide an explanation of this astonishing development that builds on the argument that the establishment of a customs union increases the bargaining power of its member countries in international trade negotiations. When facing discrimination from a customs union, exporters in excluded countries have an incentive to become politically active and lobby their governments for relief. This increase in exporter lobbying, in turn, weakens the negotiating position of excluded countries in international trade negotiations by making them more eager to achieve a negotiated agreement that lowers the external barriers of the customs union.
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| 2 |
ID:
124725
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When the European Union (EU) and the Canadian government announced the launching of negotiations to create a "new generation" free trade agreement, the EU insisted that provincial representatives be included on the Canadian negotiating team. The goal of this article is to explain why the provinces have gradually become key, indeed indispensable, actors in international trade negotiations. I examine how international trade negotiations are conducted in Canada, noting the enhanced role for provincial governments, and I focus on a comparison between the Canada-US free trade negotiations and the discussions for a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Europe.
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| 3 |
ID:
181261
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| Summary/Abstract |
Ted Woodfield takes issue with a leading historian's account of New Zealand's efforts to protect its economic interests in the late 20th century.
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