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INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   129202


Chile: country or change, backgrounds of Chilean politics after the elections / Siepmann, Katja; Zlosilo, Miguel; Benedikter, Roland   Journal Article
Siepmann, Katja Journal Article
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Publication 2014.
Summary/Abstract The Chilean Presidential and Parliamentary elections of the first-round general election on November 17th and the second round run-off for the presidency between remaining candidates Michelle Bachelet and Evelyn Matthei on December 15th, 2013 were decided by problems, not by ideology, and by past rather than future issues. These issues, partly hidden from the international public, are likely to remain over the next years. Thus comprehending them is crucial to understand the transition of the country.
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2
ID:   085418


Domestic politics and climate change: international public goods in two-level games / Kroll, Stephan; Shogren, Jason F   Journal Article
Kroll, Stephan Journal Article
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Publication 2008.
Summary/Abstract We use the theory of two-level games to explore how domestic constraints affect the outcome of bargaining games over national contributions to an international public good such as global climate change, and to discuss the implications for the Schelling conjecture. We model the international negotiations on two dimensions-domestic and foreign contributions to the international public good-and extend the basic two-level model by examining a nonzero sum, two-dimensional conflict model on level one that includes characteristics of both conflict and cooperation. Our main results suggest that if the domestic game is a ratification game (as in the presidential system of the US), then contributions do not exceed those in a benchmark game without domestic constraints. But if the domestic game is an election game (which is more important in the parliamentary system of most continental-European countries), contributions can actually be higher than the benchmark.
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