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| 1 |
ID:
113561
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although Gandhi is often taken to be an exemplary moral idealist in politics, this article seeks to demonstrate that Gandhian nonviolence is premised on a form of political realism, specifically a contextual, consequentialist, and moral-psychological analysis of a political world understood to be marked by inherent tendencies toward conflict, domination, and violence. By treating nonviolence as the essential analog and correlative response to a realist theory of politics, one can better register the novelty of satyagraha (nonviolent action) as a practical orientation in politics as opposed to a moral proposition, ethical stance, or standard of judgment. The singularity of satyagraha lays in its self-limiting character as a form of political action that seeks to constrain the negative consequences of politics while working toward progressive social and political reform. Gandhian nonviolence thereby points toward a transformational realism that need not begin and end in conservatism, moral equivocation, or pure instrumentalism.
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| 2 |
ID:
163136
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| Publication |
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2018.
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| Description |
xix, 572p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9781474423281
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059567 | 320.5/SCH 059567 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
113732
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2012.
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Within contemporary legal and political philosophy there is nothing more unpopular than defending a world state. It seems food for thought for writers like Huxley or Wells, but not a topic that deserves serious philosophical reflection. Fortunately, there are exceptions to this general rule. Theorists such as Höffe, Cabrera, Deudney and Yunker defend a version of a multilayered minimal world state - a model based on the dual principles of federalism and subsidiarity. The focus of this article is on the very fragile balance that proponents of this model have to keep between a simultaneous need for centralization and decentralization. On the basis of a critical analysis of the work of these theorists, it is argued in this article that the safeguards these authors defend to prevent a bloating of government themselves contain a tendency to hierarchical centralization. While some form of world state might be necessary to cope with the challenges posed by globalization, it is essential to discuss the shape and competences of the world state much more critically and in more detail than has been the case in the past.
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| 4 |
ID:
163623
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| 5 |
ID:
155792
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Kant’s primary concern in writing on international relations is how to achieve ‘justice’ (Recht) between states. This means that instead of reading Kant as a theorist of peace or world government, as IR theorists have usually done, he is better read as a theorist international justice. His view of justice, which identifies it with a legal order that respects freedom as independence or nondomination, is broadly republican. But he equivocates on the possibility of justice at the international level, and this narrows what is usually seen as a wide gap between Kant’s thought and political realism. The paradox his uncertainty reveals is that it is wrong for states to remain in a lawless condition yet impossible for them to escape it so long as they remain independent. An international order cannot generate genuine law because there are no institutions to make, interpret, or enforce it. This means that states are entitled to determine their own foreign affairs. The gap between sovereignty and justice cannot be closed so long as these ideas are defined as they are within the state. The problem is not that a full, secure, and nonvoluntary system of justice that preserves the sovereignty of states is contingently unlikely. It is conceptually impossible. This conclusion poses a challenge to current theories of global justice.
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| 6 |
ID:
162471
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| Publication |
Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
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| Description |
xi, 167p.hbk
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| Series |
Global Political Thinkers
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| Standard Number |
9783030017279
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059551 | 320.5/SHA 059551 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
160640
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The article examines the idea of muscular liberalism, first invoked by David Cameron as a paradigm of assertive policymaking in opposition to ‘state multiculturalism’. The rhetoric of muscular liberalism is present across western Europe, but its political effects have not been convincingly explored. In scholarship on ethnic minority integration, a ‘stimulus–response model’ credits Muslim intransigence as the trigger for the muscular stance. Other commentators put muscular liberalism into a genealogical perspective but do little to consider the circumstances of its political deployment. Working towards an alternative account, the article examines two instances of muscular liberalism in Britain: the campaign against ‘Sharia Courts’ and the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair. Different from the concern with historical continuity or stable potentials of liberal normativity, it draws attention to political operations and strategic calculations that characterize the deployment of muscular liberalism in British politics.
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| 8 |
ID:
085426
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2008.
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This article situates John Herz's work within the perennial debate about realism and idealism, and the issue of whether and how the two sets of ideas can be reconciled. The variety of `realist' and `idealist' concepts and conceptualisations within Herz's work, and his attempt to combine them in an approach he called `Realist Liberalism', reveals the inadequacy of the addiction of many teachers and researchers in academic international relations to stick unhelpful labels on theorists (such as `Realist') who advance complex and sometimes apparently contradictory intellectual positions. Placing Herz's work alongside other theorists who have grappled with the relationships between realism and idealism - notably Carr and Rawls - the article argues for categorising ideas and not individuals. More importantly, a case is made for the continuing validity of seeking to comprehend IR in terms of the interplay of idealism and realism, and for greater recognition of Herz's contribution to it.
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| 9 |
ID:
106423
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2011.
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Transformationalist thinking is plentiful. The Iraq invasion is the latest example of its failure. Is international political reality destined to be the 'realm of recurrence and repetition'? This article delineates a political theory of moderate progress found in Hans Morgenthau's political realism (Realism). Realism recognises the potentiality of transforming international relations, but, warned by its political anthropology, it envisions a distinct philosophy of politics as an effective means for achieving peace. It makes the case for a foreign policy of national security and humility, believing in progress by other means. Based on a renewed engagement with its concepts of the state, national interest and national security, Realism is shown to be critical and progressivist, restrained and realistic. Its nature and structure makes it intellectually incompatible with conservative organicist projects; nor is it reconcilable with radical critical agendas. In search for allies, Realism shows a potential affinity to a moderately Leftist politics and foreign policy.
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| 10 |
ID:
141277
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Twenty-first-century political crises stretching from Europe to the Middle East and the Asia–Pacific have undermined the worldview that governed post-Cold War western thinking about a liberal end of history. This worldview assumed that shared norms and transnational institutions would transform the state based-order. In this context, the use of force is considered appropriate only for humanitarian ends meeting a set of predetermined axioms laid down in chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Yet for any strategy to be effective—in an international order subject to change—a clear political aim is required, which might deviate from the general rule. Preoccupied with universal postulates, legal normativism has lost sight of the particular. The argument put forth in this article is that the failure of contemporary western foreign policy in the twenty-first century to address this limitation or to prioritize political ends has led to strategic confusion from Afghanistan to Syria and Ukraine. In this context, it might be useful to reappraise the utility of abstract rationalist approaches to global governance and return instead to an earlier understanding of statecraft that avoided premature generalizations and treated norms as maxims of prudence rather than axioms requiring universal application.
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