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ID: 101682

Multiple audiences and reputation building in international con / Clare, Joe; Danilovic, Vesna

Danilovic, Vesna	Journal Article
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2010.

Summary/Abstract

Reputational theory of conflict behavior dates back to Schelling's seminal work on bargaining and continues to find both its advocates and critics to date. The authors do not take sides in this debate about the relevance of reputation for bargaining behavior but rather take a modified approach to reputations for resolve and probe some aspects that were largely underexplored in past research. The authors develop the argument that, if facing multiple strategic rivals and having failed in past disputes, a state has an incentive to invest in its reputation for resolute behavior by initiating and escalating conflicts. Their focus is then on both general and immediate deterrence, and while it was standard to tie reputation to a deterrer's past, the authors direct the attention to the challenger's reputation as a potential motivator for its conflictual behavior. This new focus is validated, and the related expectations supported, in the findings from their empirical analysis of strategic rivalries from 1816 to 1999.

Key Words

Conflict ; International Conflict ; Reputation ; Militarized Disputes ; Rivalries ; Past Behavior ;
International Audiences

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ID: 085456

Role of parties' past behavior in coalition formation / Tavits, Margit

Tavits, Margit	Journal Article
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Publication

2008.

Summary/Abstract

This study considers whether and to what extent defections from a government coalition are punished. The study employs data on coalitions in eastern and Western Europe from 1950 through 2006. The results show that if a coalition breaks due to conflict between partners or if one party withdraws from it, subsequent inclusion of the conflicting parties in the same coalition becomes less likely. Additional tests demonstrate that this effect occurs because defectors are punished by their former Coalition partners. Another extension of the main analysis shows that rather than becoming pariah parties, defectors lose credibility only in the eyes of their former coalition partners.

Key Words

Party Role ; Coalition Formation ; Past Behavior ; Cialition Partnership

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