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| 1 |
ID:
085467
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the end of the Cold War, the discourses and practices of the EU towards the Mediterranean have emerged as an important area of study with regard to attempting to explain and analyse how Europe and the Mediterranean are reconstructed. This mutual reconstruction of two selves in the so-called Mediterranean relationship appears as a new type of praxis, a broadened self, following the model of European success in forming a regional security community. However, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Mediterranean idea has been constructed by exploiting the new threats facing the West and Europeans. In this paper it is assumed that the discourse and practice of the EU in constructing the Mediterranean self can be seen as an extension of long-standing European policies of constructing Europe as an area of security. In the light of this evaluation, this paper focuses on the threat perceptions of the EU, the related power asymmetries in the Mediterranean relationship and the enduring asymmetry in the perception of the European and Mediterranean self in the face of 'new' insecurities.
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| 2 |
ID:
132189
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
An antisubmarine warfare doctrine adopted U.S. Navy-wide nearly a decade ago still applies, now more than ever.
During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy (particularly the submarine force) specialized in and excelled at antisubmarine warfare against the Soviet Union. But with the demise of the Soviets, ASW was put on the back-burner as an activity irrelevant to modern conflict. Over a decade passed before submarines would again be considered a serious threat to national security. During that time the nature of the submarine threat changed, so when the Navy "rediscovered" ASW, it learned that traditional, sensor-based methods of fighting against submarines, while important, could no longer ensure victory. To respond to this new threat, a new approach emerged in 2005, one that became known as "Full-Spectrum ASW." Quickly adopted as Navy doctrine, the concept pursued a more holistic approach to solving the submarine problem. This first-ever published treatise on the concept should explain how the doctrine was developed, in the hopes that a more thorough understanding of the concept will lead to better implementation.
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| 3 |
ID:
156118
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| 4 |
ID:
130025
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2012 Vladimir Putin pledged that Russia would over the next decade invest in a smart defense, embracing new technologies to modernize its conventional forces and its strategic nuclear arsenal to ensure strategic stability in Eurasia. At the core of the demands for Russian military modernization is a very pessimistic appraisal of the current capabilities of Russia's conventional forces and the future deterrence power of its strategic nuclear forces in the face of emergence US ballistic missile defenses and global precision-strike conventional systems. Driving the Russia's notion of future war is threat environment that is complex and raises risks of local crises leading to foreign military intervention. These threats include a persistent terrorism within its own territories and Central Asia, an ideological fear of psychological subversion from the "color revolutions" of the last decade, the geopolitical threat of NATO expansion into Post-Soviet territory, and the stated fear that US military modernization will undermine the credibility of Russia's conventional and nuclear forces. Finally, in spite of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, there is also an unspoken fear that an emergent China could some day become a threat to Russia's Eastern Siberia and the Far East.
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| 5 |
ID:
137984
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent conflicts around the world have pundits anticipating WWIII; however, the next global-scale conflict could be space-based.
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