| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Not all militaries are able to learn counterinsurgency (COIN). Whether a military has the capacity to do so is determined by specific factors: a favourable political environment; and pragmatism within the respective military. During the 1970s and 1980s, the South African military exhibited both and learned COIN to devastating effect. Post 1990, however, the political environment has proven unfavourable for the continuing of COIN by the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and the military no longer practises COIN to any significant extent. Problematically, new commitments in peace support operations, in otherwise insurgent conflicts, are giving rise to a need for many of the COIN skills and tactics discarded during the transition. The strict anti-COIN position currently adhered to by the military is hamstringing its own ability to fulfil its new designated tasks and strategic objectives.
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