| Publication |
2008.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Until today the January 1996 Greek-Turkish crisis over the sovereignty status of two Southeast Aegean islets remains the pick point of Greek-Turkish antagonism. In this article, the author assesses the role of Greek military intelligence during the crisis. He argues that Hellenic intelligence did not anticipate a confrontation with Turkey over two uninhabited islets. Eventually, the MoD mobilised a disproportionate number of ships in the Aegean to defend Greek sovereignty over the Imia islets. As the crisis unfolded, the Greek prime minister became frustrated by the inability of Greek intelligence services to confirm a Turkish landing on the second Imia islet. The author shows that during the crisis hours of 31 January 1996, the lack of tactical intelligence on Turkish deployment had a direct impact on the assessment of the operational status of the Greek armed forces and on the planned crisis response. Ultimately, rather than causing an acute sense of vulnerability, fear, and an aggressive response, the lack of intelligence led to a de-escalation of the crisis.
|