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ID:
131632
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The French intervention in Mali in early 2013 emphasizes that the decision-makers in Paris, Brussels, and Washington considered the establishment of the radical Islamist regime in Northern Mali a threat to their security interests. The widespread instability including the rise of radical Islamist groups in Somalia was perceived as a threat to western interests. It is the core argument of the paper if western powers decide to provide security in Africa, they will be inclined to use proxy instead of deploying own troops. Security provision by proxy in African means that African troops are doing the actual fighting and peacekeeping on the ground while western powers basically pay the costs, the logistics, and the training of local African troops. The paper concludes that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia and The African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) in Mali are proxies for the USA and the European Union.
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| 2 |
ID:
123388
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although there are positive signs of a big power playing an important and responsible role in a war ravaged country in its aftermath, China's foray in Afghanistan reflects that it is walking a diplomatic tightrope in Afghanistan. It is trying hard to maintain a silent but highly strategic presence in the country while at the same time managing its relations with other actors present in Afghanistan. However, as the date of US-NATO exit plan by the end of 2014 approaches; the politics between various domestic, regional, and international actors get surcharged.
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| 3 |
ID:
104703
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| 4 |
ID:
116096
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| 5 |
ID:
109725
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| 6 |
ID:
132003
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The five states that surround the Arctic Ocean- Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark, and Norway-have in recent years taken various measures to protect their economic and security interests in the north. The measures include not only the adoption of Arctic strategies, but also the development of new military capabilities. As in other parts of the world, one state's military efforts to enhance its security may have the unfortunate effect of making others feel less secure, and therefore more likely to undertake similar efforts. Thus, despite being a low-tension region, the Arctic is by no means immune to the logic of the security dilemma.
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| 7 |
ID:
133905
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
"A resurgent India must get its rightful place in the comity of nations and international institutions. The vision is to fundamentally reboot and reorient the foreign policy goals, content and process, in a manner that locates India's global strategic engagement in a new paradigm and on a wider canvass, that is not just limited to political diplomacy, but also includes our economic, scientific, cultural, political and security interests, both regional and global, on the principles of equality and mutuality, so that it leads to an economically stronger India, and its voice is heard in the international fora.
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| 8 |
ID:
134034
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the mid-1990s, India faced considerable criticism for abandoning its strong support for pro-democracy forces in Myanmar. Instead, New Delhi chose to pragmatically engage the ruling military junta in order to pursue a number of key security, energy, economic and geostrategic interests that could not be achieved without its cooperation. The results of this change of approach have been modest, and as Myanmar transitions to democracy New Delhi hopes that new opportunities to progress these interests will emerge, rather than new obstacles. This article assesses whether a prospective National League for Democracy (NLD) led government will have the capacity to eradicate Indian insurgent groups (IIGs) operating in Myanmar's territory, be responsive to initiatives to expand trade between the two countries - particularly with India's northeastern states - and be more open to Indian investment. It argues that while the NLD is committed to greater economic liberalization and a closer economic relationship with India, Myanmar will not be an attractive market for Indian firms for some time (outside of the resource sector) until liberal institutions and open competitive practices are more firmly established. This article also argues that the NLD lacks a credible plan to bring an end to the country's long running ethnic insurgencies, and will not have the capacity to comprehensively crack down on IIGs.
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| 9 |
ID:
164247
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article looks at Nepal’s Buffer State predicament and the path that India and Nepal must follow to meet the national interests of both countries. The rise of Nepalese nationalism with a communist complexion and the rise of China, which seeks to expand its sphere of influence, have led to Nepal being pushed into what can be called as the “New Small Game”.China’s growing profile in the Himalayan country is a threat to India’s security interests and India has to be proactive to maintain the buffer status of Nepal. The Nepalese economic situation and sovereignty issues have motivated Nepal to seek help from China for meeting its infrastructural and transportation needs. However, the geographical advantage that India provides to Nepal for land transportation access can still not be matched by China which will affect Nepal’s strategic calculations. The demand for modification to the Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 is fallout of assertion of sovereignty and an unreal threat of being swamped by Indian immigrants. So far, the Nepalese have demonstrated remarkable understanding and good diplomatic skills to balance between two antagonistic neighbours. However, the planned Chinese land road/rail connectivity across the Himalayas increases India’s insecurity as it dilutes the buffer status. India cannot stop Nepal from seeking Chinese assistance. On its part Nepal has to balance its needs with the advantages of a neutral buffer. Perhaps with strict neutrality Nepal can become for the subcontinent what Switzerland was for Europe. India must help Nepal to achieve this and remain an effective buffer.
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| 10 |
ID:
131592
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Much attention has been paid to China's determination to exert its in?uence over the East and South China seas using both political and military power. The final ?ew weeks of 2013 saw a rapid deterioration of the diplomatic goodwill that China had built with its maritime neighbours over the past several decades, threatening regional stability and risking an arms race with the U.S., Japan, and Southeast Asia. This article draws on some snapshots of the latest sovereignty disputes in the East and South China seas and the bilateral ties across the Taiwan Strait to discuss the continuities and breakpoints in China "s strategic outreach in a multipolar world. It argues that the ability of China to pursue security interests in its maritime ?rontiers is largely contingent upon many circumstantial factors.
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| 11 |
ID:
109088
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| 12 |
ID:
085700
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| 13 |
ID:
113317
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The outbreak of the Russo-Georgian war sparked a very strong and swift reaction from the Baltic states and Poland. In contrast to other European states, they did not hesitate to accuse Russia of initiating the conflict and sought to punish it for its alleged imperialist ambitions. Traditional variables of national economic, geopolitical or security interests fall short of accounting for such acute sensitivity by Baltic and Polish politicians. Instead, this article argues that identity politics driven by historical-psychological legacies provide the most plausible explanation. The case illustrates how third parties decide their level of engagement in conflicts that have limited strategic importance to them.
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