| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
111123
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
F
or those of us who served in the Norwegian armed forces, especially in
northern Norway, the 1980s were exciting times. Norway seemed to be the
focus of American and NATO attention. There was a continuous flow of
high-ranking visitors to Defence Command North Norway (DEFCOMNON),
from the staffs of Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Atlantic (ACLANT).
1
Every year thousands of allied soldiers, hundreds of aircraft, and dozens of ships
arrived in the area to conduct advanced training and complex exercises. High
points were the deployments of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, elements of Supreme
Allied Commander, Atlantic's (SACLANT's) Striking Fleet Atlantic, into northern Norwegian coastal waters in Vestfjorden, outside Bodø: in 1985, USS America (CV 66) and, in 1987, USS Forrestal (CV 59) in Exercise OCEAN SAFARI; in
1988, USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) and Forrestal in TEAMWORK; and in
1989, America in NORTH STAR.
2
We were witnessing, and took part in, what later
turned out to be the culmination of the Cold War-the period of tension that
eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Norway, neighbor to the Soviet Union and a coastal state on the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea, found
itself at the geographical center of this final effort.
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| 2 |
ID:
152641
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| Summary/Abstract |
A resurgent Russian navy is increasingly active in the North Atlantic and around the Greenland–Iceland–UK gap. Magnus Nordenman argues that an effective response will require investments in high-end maritime capabilities, along with deeper cooperation among the US, the UK, Norway and others.
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| 3 |
ID:
162181
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| 4 |
ID:
127361
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| 5 |
ID:
130325
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| 6 |
ID:
130378
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| 7 |
ID:
151905
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| Publication |
Abingdon, RUSI, 2017.
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| Description |
xii, 106p.pbk
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| Standard Number |
9781138079618
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058973 | 355.031091821/OLS 058973 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
169526
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, first and foremost its northern stretch, is what NATO considers its exclusive zone of vitally important interests. This idea is supported by the fact that it is the site of vital lines of communication and transport bridging North America and Europe, as well as strategically important military and civilian facilities, the protection of which is becoming one of the Alliance's key objectives amid what Western sources call an unprecedented increase in activity by the Russian Navy and Air Force in this subregion. What's more, the definition of the North Atlantic is being enlarged to include not only its strictly geographic area, but the entire water surface of the Baltic and Barents seas. These bodies are now considered a single theater of operations in the case of a military conflict with Russia.1
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| 9 |
ID:
153428
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| Summary/Abstract |
Three things are puzzling about the Cod Wars, three militarized interstate disputes spread over 20 years. First, they occurred between two democratic NATO allies, members of a Western security community. Second, Iceland came close to withdrawing its NATO membership and closing the US base on Icelandic soil, which would have adversely affected the balance of power in the North Atlantic and jeopardized Iceland’s core security interests. Third, Iceland, a microstate, won each of these disputes. Historians and political scientists have consequently found it problematic to account for these puzzling disputes. This study proposes a neoclassical realist account for the occurrence and outcomes of the Cod Wars. I argue that the disputes occurred due to (i) powerful domestic pressures on statesmen to escalate and (ii) elite miscalculation. As the disputes escalated and Iceland’s Western alignment was put at greater risk, statesmen in both countries, mindful of the dangers of realignment, were able to resolve the conflicts in the end. The outcomes of the disputes reflect how British statesmen were able to make greater concessions due to weaker domestic constraints than those faced by Icelandic leaders. Iceland therefore reached a highly favorable agreement in all Cod Wars.
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| 10 |
ID:
176306
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| 11 |
ID:
085705
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