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| 1 |
ID:
142409
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| 2 |
ID:
085785
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Space warfare will be an integrated part of battle planning by the Chinese People's Liberation Army in any future conflict with the United States. The People's Liberation Army has carefully absorbed and is reacting to what the American armed forces have published on space warfare and counter-space operations. Chinese strategists and legal scholars are engaged in an internal debate on how traditional ideas of sovereignty and the laws of war apply in space. One authoritative volume explored the importance of ensuring that the People's Liberation Army sets out legal justifications for military actions in advance of any conflict. Chinese scholars believe that many of the concepts surrounding the conduct of war on the "common seas" apply in space. Also, there is disagreement between the United States and China on the American position on outer space. The United States treats "peaceful uses" to mean "non-aggressive," whereas the Chinese interpretation is that to be peaceful uses, it must be "non-military."
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| 3 |
ID:
170467
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U.S. space systems are the backbone of the U.S. economy and national security. Chinese counter-space weapon developments promise to make the satellite protection mission ever more challenging. There are significant challenges to deterring China from aggressive behavior in space, and for this reason U.S. policy makers and defense planners must start planning now for a possible future military confrontation involving China that also may involve military space contingencies. The purpose of this report is to provide a framework for thinking about deterrence and the protection of U.S. space assets.
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| 4 |
ID:
138584
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| Summary/Abstract |
As in the case of the US, for India too, satellite data and its associated connectivity touch every aspect of daily life.
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| 5 |
ID:
096665
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Regardless of whether the United States decides to extend deployment of its weaponry beyond land, sea, and air to the medium of outer space, military dependence on assets stationed between low Earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit for communication, navigation, and surveillance will likely remain high. Deterrence as a strategy to protect these assets carries with it the risk that a crisis over satellites will escalate out of control. Nevertheless, when evaluated against other options on the agenda-such as space control and space avoidance-it is the only strategy for which the United States is currently equipped militarily and politically. In order to mitigate the downsides of deterrence, in particular to stave off a decision that would require disproportionate retaliation, the new United States Administration is likely to mix in tactical elements of control and avoidance. These elements, however, will not subvert deterrence as a core strategy, nor will they obviate uncomfortable and undemocratic compromises that have marked deterrence since the Cold War.
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| 6 |
ID:
169304
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| Summary/Abstract |
The development of the antisatellite (ASAT) weapons is a crucial process of the second era of space militarization. As a result, outer space loses the status of a sanctuary. However, this process does not steam only from the technological advance but also from strategic circumstances. The increasing number of space actors makes the system less stable. The degree of dependency on space assets is significantly different in different countries, what creates the vulnerability gap. What is more, the capability to defend a space infrastructure is profoundly limited due to physical and technological limitations, favoring offensive actions. Outer space is turning into offense-dominant domain.
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