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ID:
163934
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| 2 |
ID:
146718
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| Contents |
For some years now, conventional arms control in Europe has found itself under pressure. The edifice of conventional arms control instruments in Europe consists of three main pillars; the Vienna document on confidence- and security-building measures, most recently updated in 2011; the conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, which entered into force in 1992; and the open skies treaty, which entered into force in 2002.
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ID:
072891
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Few arms control scholars or practitioners are familiar with the Open Skies Treaty and other cooperative airborne monitoring programmes. Yet the Treaty only began full-scale implementation on 1 January 2006. All NATO members and much of the former Warsaw Pact region are subject to overflights. According to the quotas specified by the treaty, Russia and the United States each are subject to up to 42 annual confidence-building overflights annually by planes equipped with cameras and other sensors, though there will be only four overflights in 2006. Other parties to the treaty have smaller overflight quotas. This is progress, but there are a host of new applications for airborne monitoring regimes that have barely been explored. This article summarizes the history and current status of Open Skies, indicating its strengths but also highlighting its weaknesses. It recommends future uses for cooperative airborne monitoring. Open Skies regimes can be an effective tool in many conflict areas including India-Pakistan and the Horn of Africa. They also have enormous potential for surveying the environment, verifying environmental agreements, evaluating degradation, and natural disaster assessment.
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| 4 |
ID:
173161
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What role can conventional arms control (CAC) and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) play in crises and conflicts? By examining the use of CAC and CSBMs during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and during Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the present article argue that CAC and CSBMs are unable to prevent intentional conflict. Their more realistic value in crises is to function as early warning mechanisms that raise the bar for and increase the costs of conflict as well as serving as instruments to monitor conflicts. To increase their effectiveness, the links between early warning and early action need strengthening and several ambiguities need to be removed, particularly form the Vienna Document, in order to improve indicators, increase warning times and raise the political costs of non-compliance. Nonetheless, when one or two sides seek a conflict, CAC and CSBMs do not provide a remedy for conflict prevention.
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| 5 |
ID:
173266
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| Summary/Abstract |
A REPORT on the situation analysis that was presented on May 21, 2019 at the Russian Foreign Ministry has been prepared under the direction of Sergey Karaganov with the participation of several leading Russian independent and government experts on security and arms control policy. The report is titled, "New Understanding and Ways to Strengthen Multilateral Strategic Stability." This is an interesting study that raises a very important problem - the search for new approaches in new foreign policy realities. We could argue in detail or in general, but the time has come to respond to the challenges that we are facing. As Isaac Babel wonderfully put it in his Odessa Tales, you cannot shut out the sun with your palms.
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| 6 |
ID:
106105
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| 7 |
ID:
000925
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| Publication |
Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997.
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| Description |
xx, 230p.
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| Standard Number |
185527945X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 040394 | 327.174/SCH 040394 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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