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| 1 |
ID:
096189
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| 2 |
ID:
143239
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| 3 |
ID:
085835
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As early as the 18th-19th centuries, the political disagreements among Great Britain, Russia, and Turkey over the Caspian Sea region brought about significant changes in its diplomatic reality. After World War I and II, the policy of the great powers also changed the diplomatic landscape of this region, which, despite all of the disputes, remained in the center of international attention. Control over the Caspian began to largely be viewed within the framework of the influence of the two main powers in the region: the Soviet Union and Persia.
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| 4 |
ID:
192123
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nationalist narratives and geopolitical reality have played an opposite role in shaping China’s engagement with the Arctic, with the former pushing it forward while the latter pushing it back. Specifically, Chinese nationalist narratives on strong feelings of love for and pride in the Chinese nation not only initiated but also facilitated China’s engagement with the Arctic. Moreover, the ‘China Dream’, an official narrative put forward by the Chinese President Xi Jinping, has driven the country to undertake proactive measures to engage with the Arctic, among others, including self-ascribing China as a ‘Near-Arctic State’ and self-designating the ‘Polar Silk Road’. In stark contrast, however, the geopolitical reality featured by Arctic countries’ policies to push back China’s activities in this region has stymied its ambition to attain great power status in the Arctic.
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