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| 1 |
ID:
085846
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
ASEAN, whose internaional prestige grew as a result of its diplomatic role in 1970s, can be seen as providing a model for linking the very disparate states of the Asia-Pacific region in a common association.
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| 2 |
ID:
133275
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars have long debated the causal impact of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund. This study investigates Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), an organization that purports to have significant influence over the market for the world's most important commodity-petroleum. Using four empirical tests, I find that OPEC has little or no impact on its members' production levels. These findings prompt the question of why so many people, including scholars, believe in OPEC's influence over the world's oil supply. The idea of OPEC as a cartel is a "rational myth" that supports the organization's true principal function, which is to generate political benefits for its members. One benefit it generates is international prestige. I test this idea using data on diplomatic representation and find that OPEC membership is associated with increased international recognition by other states. Overall, these findings help one to better understand international regimes and the process of ideational change in world politics.
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| 3 |
ID:
152918
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| Summary/Abstract |
Policymakers and international relations scholars concur that prestige is critical to world politics because states having prestige enjoy greater authority. An examination of how policymakers assess their and other states' prestige, however, reveals that this traditional view of prestige is wrong, for two reasons. First, policymakers do not analyze their own states' prestige, because they feel they already know it. They use their feelings of pride and shame as evidence of their state's prestige. Second, political and psychological incentives encourage policymakers to explain another state's behavior in ways that make it unlikely that states gain prestige. Policymakers systematically discount the prestige of other states; a belief that their state has earned the respect and admiration of others is therefore illusory. Consequently, the justification for costly prestige policies collapses. In other words, states should not chase what they cannot catch. Evidence from the South African War supports this conclusion.
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| 4 |
ID:
127037
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia's policy in Central Asia has been determined by the logic of interaction between great powers and international prestige for two decades after the breakup of the USSR. But illegal migration, or, rather, the public sentiment around it, is becoming such a significant factor in the domestic political situation that it can make Moscow revise its priorities in relations with Central Asian countries. Changes might impact even the Eurasian Economic Union project.
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