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| 1 |
ID:
152015
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although the Taliban insurgency was internally divided and unable to coordinate its activities in 2014–2015, the Afghan security forces were not able to contain it and steadily lost ground throughout 2015. Until 2015, there had been little effort to develop an indigenous Afghan counterinsurgency strategy, but a sense of urgency emerged after a string of Taliban victories. At the beginning of 2016, it was still not clear if and when the National Unity Government would be able to produce a counterinsurgency strategy and, in any case, the need for a coherent counterinsurgency approach became questionable as the Taliban appeared to be transitioning towards conventional warfare.
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| 2 |
ID:
085885
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Philippine government, military and media regularly represent the Abu Sayyaf as being the main perpetrators of atrocities in the southern Philippines. This paper challenges such representations through an outline of the phenomenon of kidnapping in the region. Opening with a vignette of the phenomenon drawn from primary sources, the paper then considers in greater detail its objective conditions, the identities of its perpetrators and sponsors, and their interdependencies. The available evidence strongly indicates that kidnappings in the zone are instigated mainly by key power brokers, who engage or collaborate with local armed groups for the purpose.
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