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| 1 |
ID:
089814
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper focuses on analysing NATO's involvement in Afghanistan, a current issue in the interaction between two main constituents of the West, the United States and Europe, with a part of the Muslim world. NATO forces in Afghanistan are engaged in one of the severest battles in the organisation's history. A failure in Afghanistan will have great implications for the transatlantic relationship as well as for the relations between the Muslim world and the West. The Alliance has been able to successfully deal with numerous challenges in the past. Would it be able to overcome the latest challenge? The aim of this paper is to examine this question. The paper starts with analysing the dynamics through which NATO reinvented itself in the 1990s, and then focuses on the post-9/11 era and the deployment of NATO forces in Afghanistan. The challenges posed by the resurgence of the Taliban insurgency are examined next, followed by a discussion of the internal rifts within NATO in general and regarding Afghanistan in particular. The conclusion assesses the chances of NATO's success and makes some policy recommendations.
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| 2 |
ID:
085903
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
On the same day (1 May 2003) that President Bush declared 'mission accomplished' in Iraq; in an announcement considered as 'marking a major victory in America's ongoing war on terror' by the Fox News, his Secretary of Defence declared that 'the major combat activity' had ended in Afghanistan. More than 5 years later, however, victory in Afghanistan seems as elusive as in Iraq. The Taliban have re-emerged as a formidable fighting force and are going from strength to strength, despite the involvement of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and more than quadruple increase in the number of foreign troops. What went wrong and how were the Taliban able to survive and pose a serious challenge to the United States and NATO? The aim of this paper is to provide an outline of the important factors for the rise of insurgency, from the initial mistakes made to the interference by Pakistan; weaknesses of the Karzai government and its national army and police; the question of legitimacy and offences to traditional and religious values and beliefs; and finally the Allied Forces and NATO troops becoming part of the problem, incapable of solving it.
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