| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
On the same day (1 May 2003) that President Bush declared 'mission accomplished' in Iraq; in an announcement considered as 'marking a major victory in America's ongoing war on terror' by the Fox News, his Secretary of Defence declared that 'the major combat activity' had ended in Afghanistan. More than 5 years later, however, victory in Afghanistan seems as elusive as in Iraq. The Taliban have re-emerged as a formidable fighting force and are going from strength to strength, despite the involvement of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and more than quadruple increase in the number of foreign troops. What went wrong and how were the Taliban able to survive and pose a serious challenge to the United States and NATO? The aim of this paper is to provide an outline of the important factors for the rise of insurgency, from the initial mistakes made to the interference by Pakistan; weaknesses of the Karzai government and its national army and police; the question of legitimacy and offences to traditional and religious values and beliefs; and finally the Allied Forces and NATO troops becoming part of the problem, incapable of solving it.
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