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| 1 |
ID:
004080
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| Publication |
Westmead, Gower Publishing, 1980.
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| Description |
x, 260p.
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| Series |
Adelphi library; no.3
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| Standard Number |
0566003449
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 020187 | 327.174/BER 020187 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
003123
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| Publication |
New York, United Nations, 1991.
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| Description |
xv,179p.
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| Standard Number |
9290450525
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 034798 | 355.03/SCH 034798 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
107575
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article summarizes the conclusions of the articles comprising this special issue. The findings and recommendations of the contributing authors are organized according to the three questions that they were asked to address regarding the implications of the life sciences revolution for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the appropriate venue to address various issues, and the steps needed to enhance the viability of the regime. For consideration at the Seventh BWC Review Conference and beyond, the contributing authors articulate an impressive number of pragmatic, constructive proposals to strengthen the norm against the misuse of biology and to reinforce the disarmament imperative that is embodied in the treaty.
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| 4 |
ID:
107570
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The confidence-building measures (CBMs) under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) have been only moderately successful in enhancing transparency because of the limited participation of state parties and the poor quality of the data provided. In the absence of a verification protocol for the treaty, the CBMs constitute the primary means by which most treaty members can gain information useful for evaluating whether states are abiding by their treaty obligations. Given their importance, the CBMs need to be refashioned: in some areas the measures should be expanded to cover additional categories of life sciences activities directly relevant to treaty compliance and in other areas trimmed back to allow other organizations to handle activities closely related to their core missions and capabilities. This article explains the importance and function of transparency in the context of dual-use activities, reviews the evolution and the current status of the CBMs, identifies gaps and redundancies in the coverage of CBMs, and introduces proposals to transform the CBMs over time into stronger proto-declarations that can truly serve as source of information helpful in making judgments about compliance with the BWC's prohibitions.
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| 5 |
ID:
171182
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As the United States and North Korea pursue negotiations on a “denuclearization” agreement, the two countries should consider initiating cooperative measures as a way to build confidence and encourage finalization of a complete agreement. Based on lessons from the initial engagements carried out under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in states of the former Soviet Union (FSU), initial cooperation should focus on safety and security, training, and infrastructure elimination. By offering to implement these initiatives now while negotiations are underway, the United States could gain additional insights into North Korean intentions. These early initiatives could be proposed without compromising the US maximum-pressure campaign on North Korea by using the current authorities of the CTR program and carefully designing specific exemptions that may be required for any agreed measures. If North Korea is truly interested in pursuing disarmament efforts, the initial cooperative projects would enable them to begin reaping potential benefits while negotiations continue with sanctions still in place. These initial proposals could also be expanded to include additional international partners such as Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan. Such programs and initiatives would support and supplement longer-term strategies to address North Korean weapons-of-mass-destruction challenges.
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| 6 |
ID:
004605
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| Publication |
Kuala Lumpur, ISIS, 1994.
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| Description |
ii, 350p.
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| Standard Number |
9679471926
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 035489 | 355.03305/NAG 035489 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
003112
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| Publication |
New York, United Nations, 1992.
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| Description |
xi, 163p.
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| Standard Number |
9290450746
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Copies: C:3/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 034236 | 359/GOL 034236 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 034237 | 359/GOL 034237 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 034821 | 359/GOL 034821 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
004197
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| Publication |
New Delhi, IDSA, 1993.
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| Description |
182p.
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| Standard Number |
8186019006
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 034810 | 359.00954/SIN 034810 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 034811 | 359.00954/SIN 034811 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
107573
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The scope of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is sufficiently broad to deal with new threats emerging from developments in the life sciences; however, more thought still needs to be given to updating and improving measures to encourage biodefense-related information sharing and transparency between states. Biodefense is and has been at the core of the BWC, but the threat of bioterrorism should not distract BWC state parties or cause them to disregard the risk that illicit state-run bioweapons programs will utilize new advances in the life sciences. More states are pursuing biodefense programs-and spending more on such programs. The BWC community must address the issue of how states and civil society observers can determine the point at which a biodefense program, or parts of it, could be secretly transformed into an offensive bioweapons program. The authors propose several measures for increasing the transparency of biodefense programs, including: national oversight, confidence-building measures, mandatory codes of practice, confidence-building visits, and an international mechanism to encourage and protect whistleblowers. The authors conclude that unless accountability and transparency in biodefense programs can be attained within the next five years, the BWC will lose its relevance.
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| 10 |
ID:
114033
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The authors draw on the record of modern-day armed conflicts and practices followed in operational training of troops and staffs to come up with a system of principles and rules guiding the Russian Armed Forces' behavior in cyberspace operations and confidence-building measures that, they believe, could maximize the opportunities offered by the global information environment for reinforcing the country's defense capabilities, containing and preventing military conflicts, promoting cooperation in the military field, and developing an international information security system.
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| 11 |
ID:
004845
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| Publication |
New York, United Nations, 1994.
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| Description |
xv,118p.
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| Series |
Disarmament Study Series; no.27
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| Standard Number |
9211422051
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 035878 | 355.033/UNI 035878 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 036034 | 355.033/UNI 036034 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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