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| 1 |
ID:
116028
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| 2 |
ID:
098125
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As a result of the policy followed regarding North Korea by presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, two inter-Korean summits were held and a substantial breakthrough made in inter-Korean economic cooperation. The steps to expand this cooperation adopted at the second inter-Korean summit could bring North and South appreciably closer and be of great material benefit to them. Lee Myung-bak's accession to power, however, and his harsher approach to North Korea have nullified a not inconsiderable portion of the efforts of his two predecessors. The inter-Korean dialogue has been terminated, the implementation of new economic plans has been frozen, and already existing projects have begun to show losses. At the same time, despite the tension in official inter-Korean relations, South Korean business continues to develop its own activities in North Korea. In August 2009, North Korea's tactic of escalating economic demands to the point where they could not be met was replaced by expectations of proposals from the South.
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| 3 |
ID:
116023
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| 4 |
ID:
116024
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| 5 |
ID:
085915
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper reviews the features of the "policy of Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity" and its feasibility, as well as, a comparative retrospective between Lee Myung Bak's North Korea policy and the previous two administrations' Engagement Policies in terms of goal, linkage between politics and economy, economic pragmatism, reciprocity, universal standards, institutional mechanisms, and international cooperation.
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| 6 |
ID:
115772
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| 7 |
ID:
109560
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
IN APRIL 2010, Barack Obama convinced leaders from forty-seven countries to meet in Washington and discuss a topic to which most had previously paid scarce attention: securing vulnerable nuclear materials. Most of these leaders cared little about the matter at hand but were eager to please a popular new U.S. president with the goal of securing all nuclear materials within four years. The desire to cultivate Obama's favor had an important payoff: high-profile attention to an issue that has often lingered in obscurity, even compared to other concerns in the abstruse world of global nuclear politics. And that attention meant potentially significant progress in keeping nuclear-weapons materials from terrorists.
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| 8 |
ID:
091863
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite continued strains on its economy, North Korea has yet to relinquish its nuclear weapons program. Coupled with such unwavering determination and tangible actions in the form of nuclear and missile tests, the perception that North Korea is only a threat within the region of the Korean peninsula and its immediate vicinity is antiquated. In fact, given the possibilities of North Korea exporting its missile or nuclear weapons technology to states such as Syria and Iran, ignoring the implications of the security threat posed by Pyongyang as global in scope would be committing a dangerous fallacy. Without exaggerating the threat through ulterior motives far removed from pursuing peace and stability in the region, one needs to set concrete principles on which to base a coherent policy toward North Korea. This would mean correctly identifying the threat from North Korea's arsenals, as well as departing from a highly paternalistic view of the North that only seeks to make Seoul more vulnerable to the security threat. In particular, coordinated bilateral cooperation between the respective administrations of Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama may act as an auspicious harbinger to the possible resolution of the North Korean security threat.
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