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| 1 |
ID:
182263
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| Summary/Abstract |
The ignominious end to the U.S. war in Afghanistan dramatically underscored the complexity and volatility ofthe broader
Middle East. Americans may try to console themselves that at
last they can turn their backs on this troubled region since the United
States is now energy self-su"cient and thus much less dependent on
Middle Eastern oil. Washington has learned the hard way not to attempt to remake the region in the United States’ image. And ifAmerican leaders are tempted to make war there again, they are likely to #nd
little public support.
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| 2 |
ID:
153514
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper argues that President Park Chung-hee’s rapprochement with the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) prior to a 1979 Middle East diplomacy summit
provides a relevant case for the analysis of South Korean foreign policy within the
framework of its pursuit of autonomy amidst conflicts within the asymmetric ROK–
U.S. alliance. Park was scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in December
of that year, but the meeting never took place due to the 10.26 incident. Enhancing
autonomy, as opposed to relying solely on the United States for extended deterrence,
was the motivation behind South Korea’s pro-PLO policy, and was considered a
massive bargaining chip for attaining a beneficial outcome at the scheduled summit.
Given this context and the nexus between energy and national security, South
Korea expected its détente with the PLO to help promote national security and a
self-reliant defense policy, while safeguarding a stable supply of oil in the wake of
the second oil crisis. A further incentive for recognizing the PLO was improving
deterrent capability against North Korea through diplomatic diversification beyond
the traditional Cold War bloc. Considering Park’s plan for strategic rapprochement
with the PLO and growing conflict with the Carter administration, it is reasonable
to assume that the purpose behind his planned visit to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was
to achieve greater autonomy.
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| 3 |
ID:
085958
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
" Start with Syria." Thus did Aaron David Miller advise the incoming Obama administration on where its Miseast peacemaking priorities should lie. Miller, a former State Department official who first made a name for himself as a leading American negotiator in the Arab-Israeli peace percesses of the 1990's had lost his faith that a deal between Israel and the Palestinians was possible, at least in the near term.
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